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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a collection of three essays about uncertainty and conducts a
country-specific study based on China.
In Chapter 1, I investigate the impact of US uncertainty shocks on China’s macroe-
conomy with a focus on the dynamic response of investment. Using a structural vector
autoregressionmodel, I find that thewait-and-seemechanism of aggregate investment
in the face of heightened US uncertainty disappears in China. Robust evidence con-
firms that the increase in state-owned enterprises’ investment in response to height-
ened uncertainty explains this puzzle, while private-owned enterprises’ investment
decreases as expected. I apply regime-dependent local projections to link uncertainty
shocks with credit regimes to explore whether the impact of US uncertainty shocks
on investment in China has varied over time in connection with the states of bank
loans. The empirical results support a positive response of state-owned enterprises’
investment to increased US uncertainty during the tightening of medium- and long-
term bank loans but a negative reaction when short-term bank loans are tightening.
Finally, I show that economic policy uncertainty conveying political signals leads to
a decline in state-owned enterprises’ investment. Overall, this paper provides richer
empirical evidence on the investment-uncertainty nexus.
In Chapter 2, I examine the time-varying responses of monetary policy to uncer-
tainty shocks in China. Based on China’s monetary policy regimes identified by the
narrative approach to identify China’s monetary policy regimes, the rolling sample
VAR confirms the time-varying patterns of distinct monetary policy instruments in
coping with uncertainty shocks. The time-varying parameters VAR further shows that
heightened uncertainty leads to a persistent decline in the policy rate and money sup-
ply, suggesting that the interest rate is a more effective monetary policy instrument
in response to uncertainty shocks. I finally investigate the state-dependent impulse
responses to monetary policy shocks under low and high levels of uncertainty and find
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that money supply instrument is less effective during the high uncertainty periods
while the efficacy of interest rate instrument won’t be weakened by the increasing
uncertainty. Overall, the empirical findings support the on-going transformation of
China’s monetary policy from the quantity-based to the price-based policy rule.
In Chapter 3, I explore the cross-country economic policy uncertainty (EPU) spillovers
in time and frequency domains, with a focus on how China’s EPU influences EPU
in other countries. The time-domain analysis shows that China is a net receiver of
global EPU but has stronger outward spillovers during the global financial crisis. The
connectedness network demonstrates that China only plays a minor role in the trans-
mission network of global EPU. The frequency-domain results further uncover that
international spillovers of China’s EPU are mainly driven by short-term spillovers.
However, during the global financial crisis, the medium-term and long-term spillovers
temporarily dominate compared to the short-term spillovers. Overall, the empirical re-
sults have important policy implications because economic policy uncertainty arising
abroad might have domestic consequences through international spillovers channel.
2
INTRODUCTION
0.1 Three Observations on Uncertainty
In an influential paper, Bloom (2009) shows that uncertainty shocks — changes in
the second moment of the total factor productivity (TFP) distribution — are an impor-
tant driver of aggregate economic fluctuations. This work in turn has spurred a vast
amount of research investigating the measurement and impact of uncertainty shocks
on economic activity. Bloom (2017) summarizes three key observations on uncertainty.
First, uncertainty shocks mainly impact investment, and investment responds more
negatively to an increase in uncertainty than consumption. Second, central bank reac-
tions have helped reduce the damaging impact of heightened uncertainty on economic
activity. Third, a number of policy uncertainty shocks within each country have a
foreign origin, in particular, countries are being influenced by repeated policy uncer-
tainty shocks from abroad.
My dissertation investigates the above three observations by focusing on the ex-
perience of China. As a collection of three essays about uncertainty, my dissertation
provides some novel empirical evidence on this topic. In Chapter 1, I investigate the
impact of US uncertainty shocks on China’s macroeconomy centered on the dynamic
response of investment. In Chapter 2, I examine the time-varying responses of mon-
etary policy to uncertainty shocks. In Chapter 3, I explore the cross-country policy
uncertainty spillovers in time and frequency domains, with a particular focus on how
China’s policy uncertainty influences policy uncertainty in other countries. Before
proceeding to the main content, the definition and measurement of uncertainty in my
dissertation should be first clarified.
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0.2 Uncertainty vs. Risk
Uncertainty is related to, but different from, risk. Knight (1921) argued that risk is the
situation where the perceived likelihood of events can be represented by an objective
probability distribution, and further defined uncertainty as peoples’ inability to fore-
cast the likelihood of events happening based on an objective probability distribution
estimated on past data.1 In a seminal paper, Baker et al. (2016) follow the definition
of uncertainty proposed by Knight (1921) and state that economic policy uncertainty
gauges “uncertainty about who will make economic policy decisions, what economic
policy actions will be undertaken and when, and the economic effects of policy actions
(or inaction)" (pp. 1598).
Although Knight (1921) clearly distinguished between risk and uncertainty, stud-
ies typically assume uncertainty to be a stand-in for a mixture of risk and Knightian
uncertainty (Greenspan, 2004; Bloom, 2014; Castelnuovo et al., 2017). Greenspan
(2004) states that “...The term ‘uncertainty’ is meant here to encompass both ‘Knight-
ian uncertainty’...and ‘risk’...In practice, one is never quite sure what type of uncertainty
one is dealing with in real time, and it may be best to think of a continuum ranging
from well-defined risks to the truly unknown".2
As Bloom (2014) summarizes, the broad definition of uncertainty explains the fact
that there is no perfect measure but instead a broad selection of proxies. Given that
uncertainty usually incorporates ‘Knightian uncertainty’ and ‘risk’ as a single concept
in recent studies, the literature has two different approaches to measure uncertainty.
By assuming that the probability distribution of uncertainty is known, the literature
1This is known as Knightian uncertainty. According to Knight’s definition, guessing the correct
card in poker is risky but betting on a future pandemic occurring is uncertain.
2Castelnuovo et al. (2017) hold a similar view and illustrate that “While being theoretically differ-
ent concepts, these two concepts are hard to distinguish in the data. This article, following most of the
extant literature, will use the term ‘uncertainty’ as a catch-all term to cover both uncertainty and risk.”.
However, in a recent study, Fernández-Villaverde and Guerrón-Quintana (2020) argue that most recent
studies regard risk as ambiguity and use uncertainty to represent the situation in which the distribu-
tion is known.
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models volatility as a proxy of uncertainty, such as the realized stock market volatility
or a volatility process for the macro variables. In another approach, the literature di-
rectly measures uncertainty through the newly developed machine learning approach,
e.g., Baker et al. (2016) measure economic policy uncertainty (EPU) through the text
mining approach. In Section 0.3 and Section 0.4, proxies of uncertainty employed in
the literature and the dissertation are detailedly discussed, respectively.
0.3 Measures of Uncertainty in the Literature: A Summary
Although the measures of uncertainty are wide-ranging, Bloom (2014) states that the
measures of uncertainty in fact are best described as proxies rather than real mea-
sures. Based on the work of Bloom (2014) and Kozeniauskas et al. (2018), the proxies
of uncertainty are organized into three categories: measures of uncertainty about
macroeconomic outcomes (macro uncertainty), measures of the dispersion of firm out-
comes (micro uncertainty), and measures of the uncertainty that people have about
what others believe, which usually arises when forecasts differ (higher-order uncer-
tainty).
In my dissertation, I only focus on the macro uncertainty. In general, the exist-
ing literature proposes four distinct proxies of macro uncertainty, including financial
uncertainty, a volatility process for the macro variables, economic policy uncertainty,
and Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (JLN) uncertainty.
The first type of macro uncertainty is financial uncertainty, which is measured
by the realized or implied volatility of the stock market. The US VIX is a popularly
used proxy of US uncertainty and global financial uncertainty given the dominant
role of the US in the global economy. The implied volatility is calculated as a weighted
average of the price of put and call options and is intended to generate a portfolio
of options that isolates the expected volatility of the S&P 500 index at the 30-day.
Formally, the option-implied volatility is defined as the risk-neutral expectation of
5
the volatility of the S&P 500 index over the next 30 days. Compared to the US, im-
plied volatility in most countries (especially emerging economies) is often available
for a much shorter period, which prevents a meaningful time-series analysis (Choi
and Shim, 2019). The realized volatility is an alternative of implied volatility. As
a nonparametric alternative, realized volatility is flexible and feasible in multivari-
ate applications and easy to implement. Assuming the daily stock prices (Pt) and the
daily returns of the stock market from each trading day St = ln PtPt−1 , annualized real-
ized volatility (RVt) at a monthly frequency is calculated by using daily stock market






i , where T is the number of trading days
in a given month and the constant value of 252 represents the number of trading days
in a typical year in the US. Based on the US evidence, some empirical studies (Choi,
2017, 2018) find that the effect of uncertainty shocks measured by realized volatility
is almost identical to that measured by implied volatility.
The second type of macro uncertainty is estimating a volatility process of macroe-
conomic variables (such as a stochastic volatility model and a GARCH model for the
interest rate and GDP). For instance, assuming that the volatility (σt) of the interest
rate is xt = ρxt−1 + eσtεt and εt ∼ N(0, 1), then the stochastic volatility models the
evolution of σt as an ARMA process σt = ρσσt−1 + vt and vt ∼ N(0, 1). The stochastic
volatility model can capture much of the dynamics of the data, especially the flexible
specification of the stochastic volatility model is able to accommodatemany time series
(Fernández-Villaverde and Guerrón-Quintana, 2020).
The literature also models the volatility in a GARCH process, σ2t = ω+ασ2t−1+βε2t−1,
where the variance σ2t is a function of its own past (σ2t−1) and the squared innovation
(ε2t−1). The main difference between the stochastic volatility process and the GARCH
model is that, there is only one shock (εt) in the latter, driving the dynamics of the level
and volatility of xt, but an extra shock (vt) in the stochastic volatility process, hence,
it is impossible to separate a volatility shock from a level shock in the GARCH model.
6
In addition, GARCH-based models generally fail to capture the magnitude of sudden
volatility increases compared to the stochastic volatility model and realized volatility
(Cascaldi-Garcia et al., 2020).
The third type of macro uncertainty is economic policy uncertainty (EPU) con-
structed by counting occurrences of events related to uncertainty (Baker et al., 2016).
The idea of counting words related to uncertainty in newspaper articles has proven to
be particularly popular, because it is easy to do with modern statistical packages and
search engines, and it can be combined with natural language processing (Fernández-
Villaverde and Guerrón-Quintana, 2020). For the US, the EPU index is constructed
by counting the number of articles in leading US newspapers that contain the words
“economic” or “economy”, “uncertain” or “uncertainty”, and one or more of “Congress”,
“deficit”, “Federal Reserve”, “legislation”, “regulation”, or “White House”. Analogous
searches are performed for the other countries.3 An obvious difficulty with these raw
counts is that the overall volume of articles varies across newspapers and time. Thus,
Baker et al. (2016) scale the raw monthly counts for each newspaper by the total num-
ber of articles in that newspaper and in that month to produce a monthly EPU series
for each newspaper. They scale each newspaper-level series to ensure that each has
a unit standard deviation for the sample period, and then take the average of these
monthly series. Finally, they normalize the average series to a mean of 100 in the sam-
ple period. The indexes are updated regularly on the policyuncertainty.com website.
The final type of macro uncertainty is proposed by Jurado et al. (2015), which
is known as JLN uncertainty in reference to those authors’ names. The JLN un-
certainty is estimated based on the implied forecast errors for real economic activ-
ity derived from a factor model that utilizes hundreds of economic and financial se-
ries. Formally, Jurado et al. (2015) define the h-period ahead uncertainty in a sin-
3EPU indexes are available for the following countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Chile,
Colombia, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands,
Russia, Spain, Sweden, UK, US.
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gle variable as the conditional volatility of the unforecastable component of the fu-
ture value of the variable; that is, the difference between the future value of the
variable and its expectation based on the information available at time t. The ag-
gregate uncertainty at the macro level is the average of the uncertainty measures
across all macro variables. Given N economic and financial series yjt (j = 1, ...,N),
























Therefore, the macroeconomic uncertainty index in Jurado et al. (2015) differenti-
ates uncertainty from traditionally used measures of volatility, such as the stochastic
volatility. Stochastic volatility does not necessarily remove the forecastable component
of a time series, while the JLN index does so by incorporating a large number of indi-
cators into the forecasting model for each time series. Besides, Ludvigson et al. (2020)
propose a novel structural VAR identification strategy via inequality constraints and
find that JLN uncertainty is often an endogenous response to output shocks, while
financial uncertainty is a likely source of output fluctuations. This empirical finding
partly explains the fact that most existing studies select financial uncertainty rather
than JLN uncertainty as the proxy of macro uncertainty when investigating the im-
pact of uncertainty shocks.
Based on the above discussion, four distinct proxies of macro uncertainty differ
along multiple dimensions, including the method of calculation, the underlying out-
come, and the horizon at which they are calculated. To compare them intuitively,
Figure 0.1 shows some of the measures of US uncertainty constructed in the litera-
ture and how they relate to key events. JLN, financial, and economic policy uncer-
tainty spiked around the 2008 global financial crisis and the outbreak of COVID-19.
However, only certain types of uncertainty increase around most other crises. For in-
stance, financial uncertainty gauged by the VIX has more extreme values capturing
the Asian financial crisis, Long-TermCapital Management (LTCM) collapse of the late
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1990s and debt ceiling debate in 2011. Economic policy uncertainty better captures
the policy-related uncertainty and tends to have a larger value in an uncertain policy
environment, such as the Brexit and US-China trade conflicts. The JLN index exhibits
fewer spikes than the VIX and EPU index. An increase in JLN uncertainty is usually
associated with substantial declines in US real economic activity (such as during the
global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic), because JLN uncertainty is a
proxy of macro uncertainty constructed as an aggregate of the volatility of statistical
forecasts for hundreds of economic series (Cascaldi-Garcia et al., 2020).
Furthermore, I calculate the pairwise correlations among three proxies of uncer-
tainty and find that JLN uncertainty and financial uncertainty have a positive corre-
lation (0.60), while JLN uncertainty and EPU only have a weak positive correlation
(0.15). It is worth noting that financial uncertainty and EPU have a very weak nega-
tive correlation (-0.03) or nearly zero correlation, which partly attributes to the coex-
istence of high policy uncertainty and low financial uncertainty after 2016 as pointed
out by Pastor and Veronesi (2017) and as shown in Figure 0.1. Pastor and Veronesi
(2017) borrow a theoretical model of Pastor and Veronesi (2012) to interpret this phe-
nomenon. In the theoretical model, financial uncertainty measured by the stock mar-
ket volatility is a function of the product of policy uncertainty and signal precision
of policy, then financial uncertainty = f([policy uncertainty] x [precision of policy sig-
nals]). The coexistence of high policy uncertainty and low financial uncertainty af-
ter 2016 is mainly caused by the low precision of policy signals, especially after the
November 2016 election. The policy signals coming from the new administration have
been difficult for investors to follow because the signals have been full of reversals and
contradictions, as summarized by The Washington Post Fact Checker.4
Figure 0.2 displays the proxies of China’s uncertainty. Compared to the US uncer-
tainty measures, the sample length of China’s uncertainty is shorter. Similar to the
4For example, one day China manipulates its currency, another day it is not. One day the US has a
good relationship with Russia, another day does not.
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proxies of policy uncertainty in the US, the Brexit leads to a sharp increase in China’s
EPU as well. Moreover, financial uncertainty gauged by the stock market volatility
captures both the Dot-comBubble and Global Financial Crisis, whereas a spike in JLN
uncertainty corresponds to substantial economic events (only Global Financial Crisis).
By further calculating the pairwise correlation, China’s JLN uncertainty and finan-
cial uncertainty have a highly positive correlation (Corr(JLN,Financial)=0.77) during
the sample period, but both JLN uncertainty and financial uncertainty have negative
correlations with policy uncertainty (Corr(JLN,EPU)=-0.08, Corr(Financial,EPU)=-
0.16).
0.4 Measures of Uncertainty in the Dissertation: A Discussion
In Section 0.3, I have already discussed four widely used macro uncertainty in the
literature, including how to measure them and how they relate to substantial events.
In this section, I further discuss the financial uncertainty and economic policy uncer-
tainty employed in this dissertation.
In Chapter 1, I investigate the impact of US uncertainty shocks on China’s macroe-
conomy with a focus on the dynamic response of investment. After Bloom (2009) pop-
ularized this idea of employing the VIX index of 30-day implied volatility on the S&P
500 stock market index, subsequent literature investigating the global spillovers of US
uncertainty select the VIX as the standard proxy of US uncertainty (Carrière-Swallow
and Céspedes, 2013; Popp and Zhang, 2016; Choi, 2017, 2018; Bhattarai et al., 2019).
An advantage of the financial uncertainty gauged by the VIX is that financial uncer-
tainty is a likely source of output fluctuations rather than an endogenous response
to output shocks, as confirmed by Ludvigson et al. (2020) through a restrictive iden-
tification strategy. Consider another important reason, given that the sample period
in Chapter 1 spans from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4, I find that the VIX is a better proxy to
capture the major exogenous events giving rise to heightened uncertainty as shown in
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Figure 0.1, compared to economic policy uncertainty and JLN uncertainty. Therefore,
I employ the VIX as a baseline proxy of US uncertainty rather than economic policy
uncertainty or JLN uncertainty.5
It is worth noting that US uncertainty might be affected by China’s uncertainty
and indirectly transmits China’s uncertainty. So, I need to demonstrate that the ef-
fect of China’s uncertainty on US uncertainty won’t alter my empirical results. To find
an appropriate proxy of China’s financial uncertainty corresponding to the US VIX,
I estimate China’s stock market volatility by using the stochastic volatility approach
proposed by Chan (2017). As discussed before, the stochastic volatility model has a
more flexible specification accommodating many time series. An obvious advantage of
Chan (2017)’s approach is relaxing the constant parameter assumption, which allows
me to better capture the stock market volatility. More importantly, Alessandri and
Mumtaz (2019) point out that the stochastic volatility specification of uncertainty is
closer to the theoretical literature on uncertainty (e.g., the reduced-form of a DSGE
model with stochastic volatility) because it satisfies the following three features: (i) un-
certainty will stem directly from the volatility of the structural shock in the economy;
(ii) uncertainty will follow an AR(1) process; (iii) uncertainty will be exogenous to the
first-moment shock. Specifically, consider the returns of Shanghai Composite Index
(St) and its corresponding volatility sequence (ht), the time-varying stochastic volatil-
ity model is specified as follows St = τt + βSt−1 + αtehtt + εSt , ht = µ+ φ (ht−1 − µ) + εht ,
λt = λt−t + ε
λ
t , λt = [τt, αt], where τt and αt are time-varying parameters. Then, I can
measure China’s uncertainty ht, as a proxy of China’s financial uncertainty in com-
parison to the US VIX.
Chapter 2 examines the time-varying responses of monetary policy to uncertainty
shocks, in which the proxy of uncertainty is economic policy uncertainty in China.
5In Chapter 1, I also study how economic policy uncertainty affects investment dynamics in China
in view of the coexistence of high policy uncertainty and low financial uncertainty after 2016 as pointed
out by Pastor and Veronesi (2017).
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The selection of economic policy uncertainty to investigate the responses of monetary
policy keeps in line with most literature (Aastveit et al., 2017; Choi and Shim, 2019;
Choi and Yoon, 2019). Choi and Yoon (2019) point out that to identify the responses
of monetary policy to uncertainty shocks, a potential endogenous interaction between
financial uncertainty and financial markets should be addressed when using financial
uncertainty. Specifically, financial uncertainty is measured through the stock market,
so if I use financial uncertainty from the financial market to investigate howmonetary
policy responds to uncertainty shocks, this will make it difficult to identify the effect
of uncertainty shocks from that of financial shocks. Therefore, I choose the economic
policy uncertainty as themain proxy of uncertainty in Chapter 2 because the economic
policy uncertainty index is constructed from an entirely different source (Choi, 2017)
and has a lower correlation with financial markets in comparison to financial uncer-
tainty (Caldara et al., 2016). In addition, I find that the main conclusions in Chapter
2 are robust even when I use the realized stock market volatility as a proxy of China’s
uncertainty.
In Chapter 3, the research motivation is to explore the cross-country economic pol-
icy uncertainty (EPU) spillovers over time and at different frequencies, with a focus
on how China’s EPU influences EPU in other countries. To achieve this purpose, I
collect economic policy uncertainty indexes in 21 sample countries (including major
advanced and emerging economies). EPU indexes are comparable because they are all
constructed through the text mining approach (Baker et al., 2016). Also, the monthly
EPU indexes have enough sample length and allowme to study the dynamic spillovers
of economic uncertainty across countries as in most literature (Yin and Han, 2014;
Klößner and Wagner, 2014; Balli et al., 2017; Luk et al., 2018; Kang and Yoon, 2019).
Chapter 3 exploring the cross-country spillovers of economic policy uncertainty
will have important policy implications. Previous studies (Fontaine et al., 2017, 2018;
Caggiano et al., 2020) confirm the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the real
12
economy through the uncertainty spillover channel, such as jumps in China’s (or the
US) policy uncertainty foster economic policy uncertainty in a country in the first place
and then impact the macroeconomy in that country. Chapter 3 utilizes economic pol-
icy uncertainty indexes in more than 20 countries and provides a fuller study on the
economic policy uncertainty spillovers by measuring the spillover index in the time
and frequency domains.
13
Figure 0.1 Proxies of US Macro Uncertainty
Notes: JLN uncertainty in the US is collected from the website https://www.sydneyludvigson.com/macro-and-financial-uncertainty-indexes.
EPU is collected from the website https://www.policyuncertainty.com/. The VIX is collected from the FRED economic data. All monthly series
from 1995M1 to 2020M4 are standardized by subtracting mean and then dividing standard deviation for better comparison.
14
Figure 0.2 Proxies of China’s Macro Uncertainty
Notes: JLN uncertainty index in China is collected from Huang et al. (2018). EPU is collected from the website
https://www.policyuncertainty.com/. China’s financial uncertainty is gauged by a stochastic volatility process of the stock market cal-
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CHAPTER 1 Revisiting the Impact of US Uncertainty Shocks:
New Evidence from China’s Investment Dynamics
Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of US uncertainty shocks on China’s
macroeconomy with a focus on the dynamic response of investment. Using a struc-
tural vector autoregression model, I find that the wait-and-see mechanism of aggre-
gate investment in the face of heightened US uncertainty disappears in China. Ro-
bust evidence confirms that the increase in state-owned enterprises’ investment in
response to heightened uncertainty explains this puzzle, while private-owned enter-
prises’ investment decreases as expected. I apply regime-dependent local projections
to link uncertainty shocks with credit regimes to explore whether the impact of US
uncertainty shocks on investment in China has varied over time in connection with
the states of bank loans. The empirical results support a positive response of state-
owned enterprises’ investment to increased US uncertainty during the tightening of
medium- and long-term bank loans but a negative reaction when short-term bank
loans are tightening. Finally, I show that economic policy uncertainty conveying po-
litical signals leads to a decline in state-owned enterprises’ investment. Overall, this
paper provides richer empirical evidence on the investment-uncertainty nexus.
Keywords: Uncertainty Shocks, Wait-and-see Dynamics, Structural VAR, Local Pro-
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1.1 Introduction
Uncertainty is a widespread phenomenon in the economy. In an influential work,
Bloom (2009) shows that an increase in uncertainty, gauged by the time-varying vari-
ance of productivity shocks, triggers a rapid drop and a subsequent rebound in output
and employment. This occurs because a higher uncertainty increases the real-option
value to waiting and causes firms to temporarily decline their investment, which is
known as the wait-and-see dynamics. Bachmann and Bayer (2011), Stock and Watson
(2012), and Christiano et al. (2014) also conclude that heightened uncertainty leads
to an economic recession. From a theoretical perspective, Leduc and Liu (2016) and
Basu and Bundick (2017) demonstrate that an uncertainty shock is a negative ag-
gregate demand shock, implying that uncertainty shocks shift the aggregate demand
curve inward and cause a contraction in output.
Given the leading position of the US in the global economy, empirical studies evalu-
ate the cross-country impact of US uncertainty shocks on advanced economies (Colombo,
2013; Jones andOlson, 2015;Mumtaz andTheodoridis, 2015; Stockhammar andÖster-
holm, 2017; Choi, 2017) and emerging market economies (EMEs) (Carrière-Swallow
and Céspedes, 2013; Choi, 2018; Bhattarai et al., 2019). However, most of the works
fail to include China in their sample.6 A possible explanation is that China’s unique
institutional background, including the socialist market economy (Prasad and Rajan,
2006; Naughton, 2017) and direct controls over financial markets (Choi and Shim,
2019), makes the responses of Chinese macroeconomic variables to US uncertainty
shocks different from other EMEs. To fill this research gap, I empirically investigate
the spillover effects of US uncertainty shocks on China’s macroeconomy with a focus
on the dynamic response of investment.
Two reasons make this empirical strategy suitable for addressing how US uncer-
6For example, Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes (2013), Choi (2018), and Bhattarai et al. (2019) select
20, 18, and 15 EMEs, respectively, but China is excluded.
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tainty shocks affect investment dynamics in China. First, Bloom (2017) demonstrates
that uncertainty shocks primarily impact investment and China is an investment-
driven economy (Qin et al., 2006; Chen and Zha, 2018). Existing empirical studies
investigate the potential effects of uncertainty on the Chinese listed firms’ investment
at the micro-level (Wang et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2019; Liu and
Zhang, 2019). However, micro-level evidence based on the listed firms draws incon-
sistent conclusions. Wang et al. (2014) find that non-state-owned listed firms’ invest-
ment is less affected by increased uncertainty, while Liu and Zhang (2019) conclude
that uncertainty significantly impedes non-state-owned listed firms’ investment, but
no such effects are found for state-owned listed firms. Therefore, a natural question I
want to address is how US uncertainty shocks affect China’s investment at the macro-
level, especially when I consider the pattern of state-owned enterprises’ investment
as the legacy of the planned economy.7 More importantly, the macro-level investment
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) avoids biased results of listed firms by including
nonlisted and listed firms simultaneously.8
Second, recent studies unveil that credit markets play an important role in trans-
mittingUSuncertainty shocks (Carrière-Swallow andCéspedes, 2013; Popp and Zhang,
2016; Caldara et al., 2016; Choi, 2018; Alfaro et al., 2018; Alessandri and Mumtaz,
2019). If an uncertainty shock affects the real economy through the bank lending chan-
nel, its impact might vary substantially hinge on distinct states (expansions and con-
tractions) of credit markets, which is known as the financial cycle view (Alessandri and
Mumtaz, 2019).9 As the primary source of external financing for firms, bank loans are
7State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China refer to firms owned by all citizens of China and con-
trolled by central and local governments. Usually, the objectives of SOEs go beyond profits, including
resources, employment, and foreign policy.
8In China, some SOEs controlled by the central government (e.g., State Grid Corporation of China)
and most SOEs controlled by the local governments are nonlisted firms. In addition, I have the macro-
level investment of private-owned enterprises (POEs) in the subsequent analysis.
9The financial cycle view is related to but virtually different from the financial frictions view. In
the financial frictions view, when financial contracts are subject to imperfect information, a rise in
uncertainty increases the external finance premium and the cost of capital and further declines firms’
investment, where credit aggregates propagate uncertainty shocks to the real economy.
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closely related to investment dynamics in China (Zhang et al., 2015; Liu and Zhang,
2019).10 SOEs finance a larger share of their investments through bank loans, in par-
ticular, SOEs are able to enjoy the preferential credit with depressing interest rates
(Song et al., 2011b). Chang et al. (2016) further document that the linkage between
SOEs’ investment and the government’s priority in injecting medium- and long-term
bank loans into SOEs is an unusual institutional arrangement in China. Therefore,
following the financial cycle view proposed by Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019), I ex-
plore whether the impact of US uncertainty shocks on China’s investment has varied
over time in connection with the state of bank loans.
The main findings of the paper are summarized as follows. First, using a struc-
tural vector autoregression (VAR) model, I find that the wait-and-see mechanism of
aggregate investment in response to heightened US uncertainty disappears in China.
Robust evidence confirms that the increase in state-owned enterprises’ investment in
response to heightened uncertainty explains this puzzle, while private-owned enter-
prises’ investment decreases as expected. Second, by employing regime-dependent lo-
cal projections that are less prone tomodelmisspecification, I provide a convenient way
to link US uncertainty shocks with credit regimes. During the tightening of medium-
and long-term bank loans, POEs substantially decline their investment while SOEs
increase their investment in the face of higher US uncertainty. The impulse responses
based on local projections confirm the disappearance of the wait-and-see dynamics of
SOEs’ investment under certain circumstances even when I introduce credit regimes.
Finally, I proxy the US uncertainty with the VIX index—option-implied volatility on
the S&P 500 index in the preceding analysis, whereas Pastor and Veronesi (2017)
find that the coexistence of high policy uncertainty and low stock market volatility is
observed. Therefore, I revisit the impact of US policy uncertainty and show that eco-
10Bank loans are the most important source of external funds used to finance businesses in China.
Over the period 2016-2018, bank loans dominate the external financing in SOEs and POEs, around
70%.
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nomic policy uncertainty conveying political signals leads to a decline in state-owned
enterprises’ investment.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, this paper enriches the liter-
ature on investigating the impact of US uncertainty shocks on emerging economies
(Colombo, 2013; Choi, 2018; Bhattarai et al., 2019). Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes
(2013) summarize that EMEs suffer more severe falls in investment and private con-
sumption, take significantly longer to recover, and fail to experience the overshoot
in economic activity. Choi (2018) further shows that US uncertainty shocks have a
substantial impact on the output of EMEs without a material impact on US output.
Similarly, Bhattarai et al. (2019) reveal that the US uncertainty shock substantially
decreases output and consumer prices while increases net exports in EMEs.
Second, this study complements extant research on the regime-dependent link be-
tween financial conditions and uncertainty (Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes, 2013;
Popp and Zhang, 2016; Caldara et al., 2016; Caggiano et al., 2017a; Fontaine et al.,
2017, 2018; Choi, 2018; Alfaro et al., 2018; Alessandri and Mumtaz, 2019). Carrière-
Swallow and Céspedes (2013) conduct a counterfactual analysis by holding bank loans
constant and conclude that the large impact of US uncertainty shocks on investment
in many emerging markets is partly due to tightening credit constraints. Alessandri
and Mumtaz (2019) further conclude that the impact of uncertainty shocks on output
during credit contractions is six times larger than that during normal times in the US.
Third, this work extends the growing empirical research by documenting a novel pat-
tern on the response of investment in China to an increase in US uncertainty, and is
associated with papers that discuss how uncertainty influences investment behaviors
(Wang et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2019; Liu and Zhang, 2019).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 explains the data
and performs a preliminary analysis. Section 1.3 describes the empirical strategy,
including the structural VAR model and local projection approach, as well as the ex-
23
ogeneity test. Section 1.4 offers the main empirical results. Section 1.5 further dis-
cusses an issue that has a bearing on the measure of uncertainty. Section 1.6 con-
cludes.
1.2 Data and Preliminary Statistics
In this section, I explain how data are retrieved and transformed, and perform some
preliminary analysis.
1.2.1 Measures of Uncertainty
To measure US uncertainty, I get a quarterly average of the daily VIX index from the
St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data, which keeps in line with Carrière-Swallow
and Céspedes (2013), Bloom (2014), Popp and Zhang (2016), Choi (2017), Choi (2018),
and Bhattarai et al. (2019). The VIX is a measure of market expectations of volatility,
as the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index, and becomes a standard proxy variable
of US uncertainty.11
Although the US is a net exporter of uncertainty to the rest of the world (Bloom,
2017), a concern is that US uncertainty might affect China’s uncertainty in the first
place and indirectly impacts china’s macroeconomy. Meanwhile, China’s uncertainty
might affect US uncertainty due to the US-China economic ties, therefore, I should
eliminate the estimation bias when investigating the impact of US uncertainty shocks
by including China’s uncertainty. Consider that I cannot collect the implied stockmar-
ket volatility in China like the US, I have to identify China’s uncertainty in a plausible
approach. Choi and Shim (2019) calculate the realized volatility of daily returns from
the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (SSECI) to construct China’s uncer-
tainty. However, Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019) point out that the volatility-in-mean
11I also consider economic policy uncertainty in the further discussion section.
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specification of uncertainty is closer to the theoretical literature on uncertainty (e.g.,
the reduced-form of a DSGE model with stochastic volatility) because it satisfies the
following three features: (i) uncertainty will stem directly from the volatility of the
structural shock in the economy; (ii) uncertainty will follow an AR(1) process; (iii) un-
certainty will be exogenous to the first-moment shock.
In accordance with the volatility-in-mean specification, I apply Chan (2017)’s ap-
proach to identify China’s uncertainty. This approach extends the stochastic volatility-
in-mean model by relaxing constant parameters and allowing time-varying features.
To make the US and China’s uncertainty comparable, I use the SSECI as Choi and
Shim (2019) to estimate China’s uncertainty index, which reflects the financial market
volatility.
Given the quarter-over-quarter returns of SSECI (St) and its corresponding volatil-
ity sequence (ht), the time-varying stochastic volatility-in-mean is specified as follows
St = τt + βSt−1 + αte
ht + εSt , ε
S
t ∼ N(0, eht) (1)
ht = µ+ φ(ht−1 − µ) + εht , εht ∼ N(0, σ2) (2)




t ∼ N(0,Ω) (3)
where τt and αt are time-varying parameters. The evolution of the parameter vector
λt = [τt, αt] follows a random walk process. ht is denoted as China’s uncertainty.12
Figure 1.1 shows the time trend of the SSECI in the first row and the quarter-over-
quarter stock market returns (100 · log( SSECIt
SSECIt−1
)) in the second row. In the third row, I
present time series plots of US uncertainty (VIXUS) and estimated China’s uncertainty
(SVChina). I also estimate US uncertainty (VIXUSEst) from the S&P 500 based on Chan
(2017)’s approach as a comparison of US VIX index. It is obvious to find that the
12Chan (2017) develops an efficient Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to estimate the
hyperparameters in three equations. A significant feature in this approach is when αt = 0 for all t,
the model degenerates to a standard time-varying parameter regression with stochastic volatility. If I
relax this assumption and allow αt 6= 0, then the model allows an extra channel of persistence.
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2007-2009 global financial crisis (GFC) corresponds to a sharp jump in the US and
China’s uncertainty. Also, VIXUS and VIXUSEst exhibit a consistent time trend and the
correlation between them is close to 0.83, suggesting the validity of Chan (2017)’s
approach in gauging uncertainty. In the meanwhile, VIXUS and SVChina have a similar
trend and a high correlation (0.63) over the sample period.13
1.2.2 Selection of China’s Variables
Following Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes (2013) and Choi (2018), I consider a series
of China’s macroeconomic variables. First, I collect GDP by expenditure (GDP), ag-
gregate consumption (C), aggregate investment (I), total bank loans outstanding (BL),
and one-year benchmark lending rate (LR).14
Second, I have state-owned enterprises’ investment (ISOE) and private-owned enter-
prises’ investment (IPOE) to study investment dynamics in China.15 In the extended
analysis, I also divide SOEs’ investment into two components: government invest-
ment injecting into SOEs (G), and SOEs’ investment excluding government investment
(ISOENG).16
Third, I consider short-term bank loans (BLS) and medium- and long-term bank
loans (BLML) because they reflect the preferential and biased lending policy guided by
the government and provide strategic services for important national economic ini-
13In the subsequent analysis, I use US uncertainty (VIXUS) and estimated China’s uncertainty
(SVChina).
14The one-year benchmark lending rate is regarded as the policy rate in China (Nuutilainen, 2015).
Although Shi et al. (2018) point out that the one-year deposit rate is the benchmark rate that the PBC
administers in China and the PBC sets the one-year lending rate by adding a proper wedge to cover the
operational costs of banks based on the one-year deposit rate. A recent reform that the People’s Bank of
China (PBC) announced the new formation mechanism of loan prime rate (LPR) in August 2019 shows
that one-year benchmark lending rate will be an ideal proxy of the policy rate in China.
15The aggregate investment is decomposed into SOEs’ investment, POEs’ investment, households’
investment, and others (joint ventures for example), whereas SOEs’ and POEs’ investments dominate
compared to other types of investments and, on average, account for around 70% of aggregate invest-
ment over the sample period.
16In general, government investment injecting into SOEs is to achieve specific government projects,
e.g., infrastructure investment. Besides, the SOEs’ investment excluding government investment
mainly incorporates fixed-asset investment and overseas direct investment, etc.
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tiatives.17 Moreover, short-term bank loans (BLS) and medium- and long-term bank
loans (BLML) as indicator variables allow me to identify credit regimes.
I collect the data from China’s Macroeconomy: Time Series Datamaintained by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.18 Compared to the data published by Chinese sta-
tistical and government agencies, this dataset offers quarterly China’s macroeconomic
and financial data more completely. Also, this dataset obeys the statistical standards
applied in the OECD database, making China’s macroeconomic data comparable to
other countries.
The sample period is from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4. During the sample period, China’s
economy is a typical investment-driven economy as well as a transition economy. All
variables are real variables in log values. Referring to Chang et al. (2016), to get
real variables of investment and bank loans, investment is deflated by the investment
price index, and bank loans with different maturities are deflated by the implicit GDP
deflator. Also, GDP is deflated by the implicit GDP deflator. The consumption and
bank lending rate are deflated by the consumer price index.19
1.2.3 Preliminary Statistics
The summary statistics are reported in Table 1.1. Figure 1.2 further plots the time
trend of China’s macroeconomic variables. The first row plots the level of the one-year
benchmark lending rate. The lending rate declines steadily in the process of inter-
est rate liberalization since the mid-1990s. There is a lifted benchmark lending rate
around the GFC due to the rising non-performing loans (NPL) ratio in most commer-
cial banks.
The second row plots quarter-over-quarter growth rates of investment (SOEs and
17All bank loans are end-of-quarter financial institution loans outstanding.
18Website: https://www.frbatlanta.org/cqer/research/china-macroeconomy.aspx?panel=2. For more
details on this dataset, referring to Chang et al. (2016).
19The real bank lending rate is the difference between nominal bank lending rate and inflation rate.
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POEs) and bank loans (short-term and long-term). Before 2000, SOEs’ investment has
a slightly lower growth rate than POEs’ investment (1.51% vs. 2.19%). Although SOEs’
investment increases substantially during the GFC, the average growth rate of POEs’
investment is much larger after 2000 (1.78% vs. 3.90%). For bank loans with different
maturities, it is straightforward to find that (no matter short-term or long-term) bank
loans have higher volatility before 2002, while bank loans’ growth rates become lower
and relatively steady after 2002 because of the safe-loan regulation imposed by the
Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (Chen et al., 2018).
The third row in Figure 1.2 plots the trend of the quarterly variable (ISOE, IPOE,
BLS, and BLML) as a percentage of the aggregate variable (I or BL). Since the mid-
1990s, SOEs’ investment share steadily declined from around 50% in 1995 to 20% in
2017 but POEs’ investment increased to 40% in 2017. Besides, short-term bank loans
continuously decline while medium- and long-term bank loans exhibit a rising trend,
reflecting a key trend fact that medium- and long-term loans gradually take priority
over short-term loans (Chang et al., 2016).
Finally, I perform Phillips and Perron’s unit root tests with and without a time
trend as Motegi and Sadahiro (2018). Table 1.2 reports the p-values of Phillips and
Perron’s unit root tests. When the test equation has an intercept only, the null hy-
pothesis of the unit root test is only rejected at the 10% level for US uncertainty while
not rejected for other series. When the test equation has intercept and trend, the null
hypothesis of the unit root test is only rejected at the 5% level for the lending rate and
not rejected for other series. I also confirm the existence of a cointegration relation-
ship by employing the two-step procedure proposed by Engle and Granger (1987). To
compare with other studies (Baker et al., 2016; Choi and Shim, 2019), I use the log-




I discuss the empirical strategy in this section. I first present a structural VAR model
and then describe the regime-dependent local projection approach. I also perform an
exogeneity test to examine whether US uncertainty is an exogenous source of China’s
uncertainty or indirectly transmits China’s uncertainty.
1.3.1 Structural VAR
FollowingCarrière-Swallow andCéspedes (2013), Choi (2018), andMotegi and Sadahiro
(2018), I consider the following structural VAR model
AYt = F1Yt−1 + ...+ FpYt−p + εt (4)
where Yt is an n×1 vector incorporating China’s macroeconomic variables and proxies
of uncertainty in China and the US. I include aggregate investment and total bank
loans in the baseline model, so YBaselinet = [VIXUSt GDPt LRt Ct BLt It SVChinat ]′. Also, I
have an extendedmodelYExtendt = [VIXUSt GDPt LRt Ct BLSt BLMLt ISOEt IPOEt SVChinat ]′. I
impose a choice of the Cholesky orderVIXUS → GDP→ LR→ C→ BL→ I→ SVChina.20
This kind of Cholesky order implies that US uncertainty as an exogenous driver has
contemporaneous effects on China’s domestic variables. I assume that the benchmark
lending rate set by the central bank only contemporaneously reacts to the observed
external uncertainty and domestic output. Also, bank loans with different maturi-
ties will contemporaneously influence investment as Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes
(2013) and Motegi and Sadahiro (2018). Finally, all other variables have contempo-
raneous effects on China’s macro uncertainty gauged by SVChina. In the robustness,
I reverse the order of all variables as suggested by Choi (2017) and Choi and Shim
20Similarly, VIXUS → GDP → LR → C → BLS → BLML → ISOE → IPOE → SVChina in the extended
model.
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(2019) and find that the empirical results are insensitive to the choice of the Cholesky
order. Fi is an n× n coefficient matrix. εt is an n× 1 vector of structural shocks. The
optimal lag order p is 4 to capture the potential seasonality in the model as Motegi and
Sadahiro (2018), so I have a standard quarterly VAR(4) model. I set the simultaneous
relation of the identified shocks by assuming that A is a lower triangular matrix
A =

a11 0 ... 0
a21 a22 ... 0
... ... ... 0
an1 ... ann−1 ann

The reduced-form representation is expressed as
Yt = B1Yt−1 + ...+ BpYt−p + A
−1Σut, ut ∼ (0, I) (5)




σ1 0 ... 0
0 σ2 ... 0
... ... ... 0
0 ... 0 σn

where σi is the standard deviation of each identified orthogonal shock.
In the subsequent analysis, I have two extra extended models. First, I decompose
SOEs’ investment into government investment and SOEs’ investment excluding gov-
ernment investment, YGt = [VIXUSt GDPt LRt Ct BLSt BLMLt Gt ISOENGt IPOEt SVChinat ]′.
Second, I use economic policy uncertainty as an alternative of uncertainty in the fur-
ther discussion, then YEPUt = [EPUUSt GDPt LRt Ct BLSt BLMLt ISOEt IPOEt EPUChinat ]′.
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1.3.2 Local Projection Method
In view of credit regimes caused by the preferential and biased credit policy in China,
I follow the financial cycle view of Alessandri andMumtaz (2019) and further estimate
how US uncertainty shocks affect investment behaviors of SOEs and POEs in China
when credit conditions are tight or loose. Referring to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012) and Choi and Yoon (2019), I employ the regime-dependent local projection ap-
proach proposed by Jordà (2005) to shed light on this research issue, because unlike
a model where each dependent variable interacts with a measure of the financial con-
dition, regime-dependent local projections permit a direct test of whether the effect of
uncertainty shocks varies across different regimes (Choi and Yoon, 2019).
I adopt local projections over commonly used nonlinear structural VARmodels (e.g.,
Markov-switching or threshold-VAR models) for two reasons. First, the local projec-
tion method yields more robust results with respect to model misspecification because
this method does not impose any dynamic restrictions embedded in the VAR model
(Ramey, 2016; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018; Choi and Shim, 2019; Albrizio et al.,
2020). Second, impulse responses in local projections are computed separately for each
horizon and each variable, implying that less computationally burdensome compared
to the nonlinear VAR models. Therefore, this method provides a reliable and conve-
nient way to study the potential regime-dependent nature of uncertainty shocks as
suggested by Cheng et al. (2018) and Choi and Yoon (2019).
Following Aastveit et al. (2017), Cheng et al. (2018), and Choi and Shim (2019), I
estimate a variable y’s horizon h response to a US uncertainty shock occurring at time
t by using local projections and consider the following regression equation





θh,kZt−k + ut+h (6)
where h refers to the horizon. yt is the endogenous variables of interest, including
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SOEs’ and POEs’ investments (ISOE and IPOE). αh is a constant term, ut is the model
residual. Zt is a vector of control variables that include four lags of all variables in the
baseline model. The coefficient γh represents the response of yt at time t + h to a US
uncertainty shock at time t.
To investigate whether the impact of US uncertainty shocks on China’s investment
dynamics depends on credit regimes, I extend the regression equation (6) as follows:
yt+h = αh + βhVIX
US
t (1− ICRt ) + γhVIXUSt ICRt +
4∑
k=1
θh,kXt−k + ut+h (7)
where ICRt is an indicator function taking the value of 1 when bank loans are loose
and 0 otherwise. So, ICRt measures two states of the credit market: expansions and
contractions. Following Drehmann and Yetman (2018), I use the cyclical components
of bank loans (short-term or long-term) based on the HP filter to construct this indi-
cator.21 Xt includes the interaction terms between the lagged control variables Zt and
the lagged indicator function ICRt . The coefficients βh and γh capture the impact of US
uncertainty shocks on the variables of interest under tight and loose credit conditions,
respectively.22 Following Aastveit et al. (2017) and Cheng et al. (2018), I employ the
ordinal least squares to estimate regression equations ((6) and (7)) for each horizon.
Also, I adopt the Newey-West variance estimator to overcome the serial correlations
among the residuals.
Finally, I discuss how to estimate the impulse response functions based on the lo-
cal projection approach. The impulse response functions from the linear VAR model
may cause biased results, especially at longer horizons when the empirical model is
misspecified. To calculate the impulse response functions in a standard VAR model,
21Given that I have two types of bank loans (short-term or long-term), so I have two kinds of indicator
functions. In Section 1.4.5, I present more details on constructing this indicator.
22Later, I use a smooth transition function to identify the regimes of bank loans to test the robustness
of regime-dependent results and find that the empirical conclusions do not depend on a particular
identification of credit regimes.
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I derive the impulse response functions iteratively depending on the original VAR
parameter estimation and moving forward period-by-period. Therefore, the impulse
response functions in the linear VAR model amplify any model misspecification. In
contrast, a local projection approach proposed by Jordà (2005) is robust to the model
misspecification.
I briefly describe the basic procedures to calculate the impulse response functions
based on the local projection approach. Following Jordà (2005), yt is an n× 1 random
vector of the variables we care about, I consider the impulse response function (IRF)
at time t+ s from the shock at time t as
IRF (t, s, dt) =
∂yt+s
∂δt
= E [yt+s|δt = dt; Xt]− E [yt+s|δt = 0; Xt] (8)
for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n; s = 0, 1, 2, ..., h; Xt = (yt−1, yt−2, ..., yt−p)′. The operator E[·|·] is the
best mean squared error predictor. dt contains the relevant experimental shocks.
Considering projecting yt+s onto the linear space generated by (yt−1, yt−2, ..., yt−p),
then we have
yt+s = α
s + βs+11 yt−1 + β
s+1
2 yt−2 + . . .+ β
s+1
p yt−p + u
s
t+s s = 0, 1, 2, ..., h (9)
where αs is a vector of constants and βs+1j arematrices of coefficient at lag j and horizon
s+ 1. So, the collection of h regressions in (9) is denoted as local projections. For each
horizon s = 0, 1, 2, ..., h, a projection is employed to estimate the coefficients in βs+1j .
The impulse responses from the local-linear projections are ÎRF (t, s, dt) = β̂s1dt, with
the obvious normalization β10 = I. Therefore, an innovation to the ith variable in the
vector yt generates an impulse response coefficients of β̂s1.
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1.3.3 Exogeneity Test
Identifying the causal effects of US uncertainty shocks on China’s macroeconomy de-
pends on the presumption that US uncertainty is exogenous to China’s uncertainty.
Otherwise, US uncertainty only indirectly transmits China’s uncertainty shock. Bloom
(2017) points out that uncertainty in smaller economies usually has a foreign origin
from larger economies, especially the US.
To formally address the exogeneity of US uncertainty, I perform the linear and non-
parametric Granger causality tests. The linear Granger causality test might make the
estimation results unreliable due to the oversimplification of model specification. Diks
and Panchenko (2006) and Diks and Wolski (2016) propose a nonparametric Granger
causality test to avoid model misspecification, especially when a nonlinear channel
exists in the VAR model.
Assume that there is no Granger causality from China’s uncertainty to US uncer-
tainty, then SVChina ; VIXUS. Conversely, I have VIXUS ; SVChina. Consider the linear




βiXt−i + u1t (10)
Xt = g(Xt−1, ...,Xt−p) + u2t (11)
where Xt = {VIXUSt , SVChinat }. In the nonparametric VAR(p) model, g(.) is an arbi-
trary function. Define Vt = VIXUSt , Yt = SVChinat , Zt = SVChinat+1 and their compact form
is Wt = (Vt,Yt,Zt). Let f̂W (Wi) denote a local density estimator of a dw-variate random





IWii = I (Wi −Wi < εn), I(·) is the indicator function and εn is the bandwidth, depending





t=1 [̂fV,Y,Z(Vt,Yt,Zt)̂fY(Yt)− f̂V,Y(Vt,Yt)̂fY,Z(Yt,Zt)]. Theoretically, the test
statistic Tns converges in distribution to a standard normal distribution. The optimal
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bandwidth in the kernel density function is selected by the modified rule of thumb
derived by Diks and Wolski (2016). The optimal lag in the linear Granger causality
test is chosen by the Hannan-Quinn information criterion. I set the same lag length
for the nonparametric Granger causality. I only need to test whether the coefficients
on the lagged variables should be jointly zero.
Table 1.3 summarizes the results from the exogeneity test. The second column lists
a series of null hypotheses. The third column presents p-values. In the linear and non-
parametric models, I reject the null hypothesis that “US uncertainty does not predict
China’s uncertainty”, but I cannot reject the null hypothesis that “China’s uncertainty
does not predict US uncertainty”. Therefore, there exists a unidirectional causal effect
from US uncertainty to China’s uncertainty rather than a reverse causal channel.
1.4 Empirical Results
In this section, I present empirical evidence from the VARmodel and local projections.
1.4.1 Baseline VAR Model
Baseline Results I first discuss the baseline model in Figure 1.3 and analyze how
one standard deviation US uncertainty shock affects GDP, benchmark lending rate,
aggregate consumption, aggregate investment, and total bank loans in China. The
shaded areas represent 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals.
First, higher uncertainty leads to a decline in GDP, consumption (C), and bench-
mark lending rate (LR), which is consistentwithCarrière-Swallow andCéspedes (2013),
Choi (2018), and Bhattarai et al. (2019). Second, from the magnitude of percentage
changes (absolute value), I find that the maximum fall in aggregate investment is
greater than that in aggregate consumption, which highlights a larger response of in-
vestment to heightened US uncertainty as in Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes (2013)
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and Bloom (2017). Third, in response to US financial uncertainty shocks, total bank
loans (BL) in China increase rather than decrease in comparison to the evidence of
other EMEs (Choi, 2018), which partly attributes to US uncertainty shocks won’t lead
to higher borrowing costs in China because of the lower benchmark lending rate. Fi-
nally, US uncertainty will give rise to a higher China’s uncertainty in the initial pe-
riods due to the cross-country spillovers of uncertainty, which keeps in line with the
empirical evidence of Kang et al. (2019) and among other studies.
A critical empirical puzzle shown in Figure 1.3 is the reaction of aggregate invest-
ment (I). Although most empirical results establish the negative nexus between in-
vestment and uncertainty, my findings do challenge previous studies (Bernanke, 1983;
Bloom, 2009; Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes, 2013; Bloom, 2014; Bloom et al., 2018)
and support that the wait-and-see mechanism of aggregate investment in response
to heightened US uncertainty disappears in China. It is worth pointing out that the
disappearance of the wait-and-see dynamics of macroeconomic variables is not exclu-
sive. Choi (2013) demonstrates that uncertainty shocks fail to produce the wait-and-
see dynamics in the US after 1983 and ascribes the instability of such dynamics to a
regime switch in USmonetary policy in the early 1980s. To understand the disappear-
ance of the wait-and-see mechanism of aggregate investment in China, I first examine
whether three potential channels (the credit channel, and the interest rate channel,
and uncertainty spillover channel) cause the increasing investment in response to US
uncertainty shocks by carrying out the counterfactual analysis in the baseline model.
The credit channel A possible amplification mechanism and source of per-
sistence for the uncertainty shock is the credit channel.23 Therefore, an increase in
the total bank loans in response to US uncertainty shocks gives me an idea of how
much quantitative relevance the credit channel could have on investment. Following
Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes (2013), I conduct a counterfactual exercise by setting
23This is also known as a financial frictions view.
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zero to the coefficients of total bank loans (BL) to US uncertainty in the equation mod-
eling total bank loans. Figure 1.4 shows the impulse responses of the counterfactual
analysis. The red dashed lines represent the counterfactual results when the total
bank loans are not allowed to directly respond to US uncertainty shocks. Controlling
for total bank loans insignificantly changes the dynamics of macroeconomic variables
in China in response to US uncertainty shocks. Therefore, financial frictions play
a limited role at the aggregate level for China during uncertainty shocks, although
Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes (2013) find that the negative responses of investment
and consumption in other EMEs become smaller (in absolute values) after shutting
off the responses of domestic bank loans to US uncertainty shocks.
The benchmark lending rate channel Another channel affecting the impact
of uncertainty shocks is the monetary policy through the policy rate (Caggiano et al.,
2017b). Back to the baseline model in Figure 1.3, I find that the benchmark lending
rate declines in response to heightened US uncertainty, suggesting that the PBC will
take expansionary monetary policy. Therefore, a potential channel is that the lower
benchmark lending rate leads to an increase in the domestic aggregate investment due
to a direct drop in the financing costs. To investigate the role of benchmark lending
rate in shaping the patterns of aggregate investment in response to US uncertainty
shocks, I also perform a counterfactual exercise by zeroing the coefficients of bench-
mark lending rate (LR) to US uncertainty shocks. Figure 1.5 presents the impulse
responses of the counterfactual analysis by keeping the benchmark lending rate fixed
in response to US uncertainty shocks. For China’s macroeconomic variables except for
the total bank loans, they look very similar to the ones in the baseline scenario. The
counterfactual analysis corroborates that the increased amplitude of the total bank
loans is reduced by almost half from 6 to 10 quarters.
The uncertainty spillover channel The third possible channel is the uncer-
tainty spillover channel. Caggiano et al. (2020) show that domestic uncertainty does
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transmit US uncertainty shocks via uncertainty spillover channel based on the empiri-
cal evidence of Canada. From Figure 1.3, I find that US uncertainty results in a higher
China’s uncertainty in the initial periods but after that, China’s uncertainty declines
substantially. Therefore, a conjecture is that fluctuations in uncertainty occurring
in the US might decline China’s uncertainty and further impact China’s macroecon-
omy, including the investment dynamics.24 To investigate this conjecture, following
Caggiano et al. (2020), I further conduct a counterfactual exercise by setting zero
to the coefficients of China’s uncertainty (SVChina) to US uncertainty in the equation
modeling China’s uncertainty. Figure 1.6 displays the responses of China’s macroe-
conomic variables to one standard deviation US uncertainty shock after closing the
direct response of China’s uncertainty to US uncertainty. Overall, even if I eliminate
the spillover effects of US uncertainty on China’s uncertainty, I find no substantial
changes in response to US uncertainty shocks, in particular, the positive response of
aggregate investment to heightened uncertainty still holds in China.
1.4.2 Extended VAR Model
Based on the proceeding analysis, no matter removing the credit channel or the uncer-
tainty spillover channel, the positive investment-uncertainty nexus still exists. There-
fore, to investigatewhat causes the disappearance of the negative investment-uncertainty
nexus in China, I proceed to the extended model. I include SOEs’ and POEs’ invest-
ments, as well as short-term and long-term bank loans in the extended model. First,
as the legacy of the planned economy, SOEs’ investment dominates the Chinese econ-
omy at both central and local levels (Naughton, 2018), whereas the share of POEs’
investment in the aggregate investment substantially increases after the reform of
SOEs in the late periods of the twentieth century (Chang et al., 2016).25 Second, bank
24If this conjecture is right, then investment will have a larger positive response to US uncertainty
shocks after keeping China’s uncertainty constant.
25Also see Figure 1.2.
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loans with different maturities reflect specific lending policies guided by the govern-
ment and the central bank.
Figure 1.7 depicts the impulse responses in the extended model. The blue lines
show the responses to one standard deviation US uncertainty shock. I find that SOEs’
investment has a positive response in response to heightened US uncertainty. Un-
like SOEs’ investment, POEs’ investment exhibits a drop and rebound behavior due
to an increase in the real option value of waiting as Bloom (2009). In addition, the
immediate response of long-term bank loans (BLML) to the US uncertainty shock is
significantly positive, on the contrary, the US uncertainty shock has a positive im-
pact on short-term bank loans (BLS) in initial periods and a lagged negative effect
on short-term bank loans in subsequent periods. I can explain the sluggish reaction
of short-term bank loans based on unused commitments as Gilchrist and Zakrajšek
(2012), namely, commercial banks first cut the unused commitments and then shrinks
the loans outstanding.
How to understand the opposite responses of SOEs’ and POEs’ investments to US
uncertainty shocks? I tentatively investigate the dynamic relationship between invest-
ments and bank loans on the basis of the extended model before I formally examine
the regime-dependent impacts of US uncertainty shocks on China’s investments. The
green lines in Panel A of Figure 1.8 show the responses of investment to one standard
deviation bank loan shock in the extended model. A rise in short-term bank loans de-
clines POEs’ investment while a rise in long-term bank loans lifts SOEs’ investment.
To better understand the reasons behind the impulse responses, I present the time-
varying correlations between investment and bank loans in Panel B of Figure 1.8 by
using a 10-year moving window as Chang et al. (2016).26 Obviously, the dynamic cor-
relation between ISOE and BLS has a continued downward trend after the 2007-2009
global financial crisis. However, the correlation between ISOE and BLML has a steady
26I use the HP filter to detrend all series of investment and bank loans. The smoothing parameter
in the HP filter takes 1600 for quarterly data.
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growing trend (from 0.1 to 0.7). When I turn to the POEs’ investment, I find opposite
changes in the dynamic correlation. In view of the institutional background in China,
commercial banks give more loans to SOEs in the form of medium- and long-term
loans financing fixed investment while more short-term loans to POEs for financing
working capital (Chang et al., 2016). Therefore, the changing correlations imply that
US uncertainty shocks might yield regime-dependent effects on China’s investment
behaviors in different credit regimes.
1.4.3 The Role of Government Investment
How to understand the underlying distinction between SOEs’ and POEs’ investments?
First, given SOEs serving as agents of the state, the Chinese government injects
amounts of investment targeting into SOEs for a long time (Chang et al., 2016). Sec-
ond, with the reform of SOEs starting in the 1980s, the SOE is gradually becoming a
“normal” firm in management decisions, e.g., the majority of SOEs are in the regional
experiments that delegate more authority to SOEs’ managers (Xu, 2011). Figure 1.9
shows the time trend of two components of SOEs’ investment: government investment
(G) and SOEs’ investment excluding government investment (ISOENG). It is straight-
forward to find that although the SOEs’ investment excluding government investment
substantially exceeds government investment after 2010, the share of government in-
vestment in SOEs’ investment is still greater than 20%. Therefore, a natural issue I
further address is “Now that the SOE gradually becomes a ‘normal’ firm, is the unique
pattern of SOEs’ investment caused by the injection of government investment into
SOEs?”
The answer is no, at least during my sample period. By introducing government
investment (G) and SOEs’ investment excluding government investment (ISOENG) into
the extendedmodel, I still cannot establish the negative investment-uncertainty nexus.
Figure 1.10 presents the responses to one standard deviation US uncertainty shock in
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the first extended model where ISOE is replaced by G and ISOENG. No matter SOEs’ in-
vestment excluding government investment or government investment, they both have
positive responses to a higher US uncertainty shock. In addition, SOEs’ investment
excluding government investment has a more active (significantly positive) response
to heightened US uncertainty, whereas the response of government investment is not
significantly different from zero.
Why SOEs abandon the wait-and-see mechanism? A plausible interpretation of
the positive response of SOEs’ investment to US uncertainty shocks attributes to the
dual objective of SOEs in China (Liu and Zhang, 2019). The dual goal of SOEs includes
economic incentives that maximize the profits like the private enterprises and polit-
ical incentives that the central government exerts specific policy objectives on SOEs
to regulate the economy and to achieve structural transformation (Lin et al., 1998;
Song et al., 2011a). Accordingly, the political incentives strengthen SOEs’ investment
through external financing (e.g., bank loans and the issuance of shares and bonds)
irrespective of government investment and give rise to more active reactions of SOEs’
investment. In sum, compared to POEs’ investment, increasedUS uncertainty will not
generate a negative impact on SOEs’ investment decisions because of the combination
of economic and political incentives.
1.4.4 Variance Decomposition
To gauge the role of US uncertainty shocks in driving China’s real economy, I further
perform the forecast error variance decomposition at the horizons from 6 quarters to
32 quarters as suggested by Uribe and Yue (2006).27 Table 1.4 reports the forecast
error variance decomposition. The variance decomposition of the baseline are shown
in Panel A. I only focus on the values at the prediction horizon of h=32. It is clear
27Uribe and Yue (2006) point out that researchers typically define the business cycle as movements
in time series of frequencies ranging from 6 quarters to 32 quarters.
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that the importance of uncertainty shocks in explaining movements in consumption
(18.44%) is greater than in GDP and aggregate investment (6.86% and 13.65%). Also,
US uncertainty accounts for around one-quarter fluctuations in China’s benchmark
lending rate. Panel B and panel C report the variance decomposition in two extended
models.28 Panel B reports the variance decomposition in the extended model. Again,
at the prediction horizon of h=32, the US uncertainty shock accounts for larger fluctu-
ations in SOEs’ investment than in POEs’ investment (18.62% vs. 13.29%). In Panel C,
I uncover that the US uncertainty shock explains smaller fluctuations in government
investment than in SOEs’ investment excluding government investment. Compared
to POEs’ investment, fluctuations in the SOEs’ investment excluding government in-
vestment explained by the US uncertainty shock are larger.
1.4.5 Impulse Responses across Credit Regimes: Local Projec-
tions
Recall the dynamic correlations between investment and bank loans in Figure 1.8,
the US uncertainty shock might yield regime-dependent impacts in different credit
regimes. Following Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019), I investigate how US uncertainty
shocks affect the investment dynamics of SOEs andPOEs by introducing credit regimes.
Specifically, I take advantage of the flexibility afforded by the local projection approach
and link credit regimes with US uncertainty shocks. As mentioned before, local pro-
jections not only overcome themodel misspecification but are also less computationally
burdensome compared to the nonlinear VAR models.
Validity of Local Projections To examine the validity of the local projection ap-
proach, I re-estimate the baseline and extended model and explore the impacts of US
uncertainty shocks on investment and bank loans. Thus, local projections also serve as
a new robustness test on the previous specification. The blue lines are the impulse re-
28It is meaningless to compare the magnitude of variance decomposition in different models.
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sponses in the baseline VARmodel, whereZBaselinet = [VIXUSt GDPt LRt Ct BLt It SVChinat ]′
in equation (6). The red lines are the impulse responses of the extended VAR model,
where ZExtendt = [VIXUSt GDPt LRt Ct BLSt BLMLt ISOEt IPOEt SVChinat ]′ in equation (6).
Figure 1.11 displays the results using local projections. In general, the impulse re-
sponse functions are less smooth compared to the SVAR model, since local projections
do not impose any restrictions on the impulse responses (Ramey, 2016). It is worth
pointing out that the key findings do not rely on any particular estimation technique,
and this type of alternative approach still yields similar results. Overall, a higher US
uncertainty shock induces an increase in aggregate investment (I), SOEs’ investment
(ISOE), and long-term bank loans (BLML), while causes a drop in POEs’ investment
(IPOE). The only difference is the reaction of short-term bank loans (BLS). In response
to a higher US uncertainty shock, short-term bank loans have a lagged negative re-
sponse in the SVAR model, while an immediate positive response when I turn to local
projections.
Identification of Credit Regimes Before I turn to estimate the regression
equation (7), I should first identify credit regimes.29 Following the strategy proposed
by Drehmann and Yetman (2018), I use the HP filter to extract the cyclical compo-
nents of short-term bank loans (BLS) and medium- and long-term bank loans (BLS).
Specifically, the positive cyclical components correspond to credit expansions, then
the indicator (ICR) takes the value of 1. The negative cyclical components correspond
to credit contractions, then the indicator (ICR) takes the value of 0.30 So, I have two
types of indicators characterizing credit regimes based on the cyclical components of
short-term or long-term bank loans.
29Cheng et al. (2018) and Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019) use the financial condition index as a real-
time indicator of financial distress to identify credit regimes. However, this type of index is not available
in China.
30Claessens et al. (2012) employ another way to find the financial cycle through an extended BBQ
algorithm introduced by Harding and Pagan (2002) and identify the turning points in the log-level
variable. Because the financial cycle has a much lower frequency and the average length of the financial
cycle is 15 to 20 years (Borio, 2014), so I cannot capture enough variations in credit regimes via the
extended BBQ algorithm.
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Figure 1.12 presents the cyclical components of two types of bank loans. It is ev-
ident to find a negative comovement between long-term loans and short-term loans
over the sample period.31 This is also a key cyclical pattern confirmed by Chang et al.
(2016). Given that total bank loans are targeted by the government, a rise in new long-
term loans will cause a tendency for new short-term loans to fall. Chang et al. (2016)
point out the government’s credit priority towardsmedium- and long-term loans at the
cost of crowding out short-term loans in China. Because the costs of short-term loans
are much higher, the large monopolistic banks in the credit market often decide their
preferential loans to SOEs rather than POEs in the form of medium-and long-term
loans.32
Regime-dependent Impulse Responses To link the impact of US uncertainty
shocks with credit regimes, I estimate the regression equation (7) by including an indi-
cator function characterizing China’s credit conditions. Figure 1.13 shows the regime-
dependent impulse response functions using local projections. The red and blue lines
correspond to the loose and tight credit conditions, respectively. The solid and dashed
lines correspond to the indicator function identified by short-term bank loans (BLS)
and long-term bank loans (BLML), respectively.
Of particular interest in this study is the investment patterns of SOEs and POEs
across credit regimes, as shown in Figure 1.13. First of all, POEs will increase their
investment in response to a higher US uncertainty shock under loose credit conditions,
suggesting that the amplifying effects of credit markets in good times on investment
exceed the delayed effects of uncertainty shocks. Besides, an increase in US uncer-
tainty associated with a tightening of financial conditions via a reduction in the credit
supply declines POEs’ investment, which keeps consistent with investment dynam-
ics in other EMEs as shown by Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes (2013). It is worth
31The correlation between two cyclical series is -0.206.
32There is a negative correlation between short-term and long-term loans in China in sharp contrast
to the positive one in the US (Chang et al., 2016).
44
noting that the responses of SOEs’ investment exhibit a more complex pattern dur-
ing credit contractions. Although SOEs decline their investment during contractions
in short-term bank loans, SOEs’ investment will have a persistent positive response
when medium- and long-term bank loans are tight.
How to understand the positive reaction of SOEs’ investment when medium- and
long-term bank loans are tight? I note that SOEs have better access to external credit
than POEs because of the implicit guarantee of the Chinese government for SOEs.33
In turn, due to the existence of the implicit guarantee, commercial banks tend to pro-
vide more medium- and long-term loans to SOEs at the sacrifice of the credit demand
of POEs, which is known as tendentious financial policies (Song et al., 2011b). That is,
a contraction in medium- and long-term bank loans only declines the external financ-
ing of POEs rather than SOEs. Therefore, this kind of ownership advantage as an
institutional arrangement (Shi and Zhang, 2018; Liu and Zhang, 2019) accounts for
the positive responses of SOEs’ investment to heightened US uncertainty even during
the tightening of medium- and long-term loans.
1.4.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, to ensure that empirical results are not sensitive to the model mis-
specification and variable transformation, I perform a battery of robustness checks to
confirm the preceding analysis.
First, I explore whether the responses of SOEs’ investment and POEs’ investment
toUS uncertainty shocks are robust. Specifically, I first exclude the global financial cri-
sis from 2008Q1 to 2009Q4. Because the Chinese government has a four trillion-yuan
stimulus package (mainly injecting investment to the local government and SOEs),
which might substantially affect the empirical results. Second, I consider the variable
33This is known as the soft budget constraint. Xu (2011) mentions that the soft budget constraint is
a major moral hazard problem in all centralized economies and transition economies.
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transformation including nominal variables and growth rates. Finally, I reverse the
Cholesky order as SVChina → IPOE → ISOE → BLML → BLS → C→ LR→ GDP→ VIXUS
and select a different lag length of 2. Figure 1.14 only presents the responses of SOEs’
and POEs’ investments. I find that the positive investment-uncertainty nexus in SOEs
is extremely robust to different specifications. Also, various specifications will not al-
ter the basic results of POEs’ investment.
Second, to confirm that the robustness of the identification of the credit regimes,
I identify the credit regimes through the smooth transition function rather than the
HP filter method. Following Albrizio et al. (2020), I use the expansion probability
F(zt) =
1
1+exp(−θzt) (θ = 1.5) to replace the indicator function I
CR
t in equation (7), where
zt is the quarter-over-quarter real growth rates of bank loans (BLS or BLML). Figure
1.15 presents the expansion probability of two types of bank loans, which well captures
the changes in growth rates of bank loans as shown in Figure 1.2. Figure 1.16 displays
the impulse responses across credit regimes identified by the smooth transition func-
tion. It is evident to find that the empirical results are robust even when a different
approach is employed to identify the regimes of bank loans.
1.5 Further Discussion: Policy Uncertainty vs. Mar-
ket Volatility
The VIX index is regarded as a kind of financial market uncertainty because the VIX
index represents the implied S&P 500 stock market volatility. Different from the VIX
index, economic policy uncertainty (EPU) is a news-based index through textual anal-
ysis and measures uncertainty about who will make economic policy decisions, what
economic policy actions will be undertaken and when, and the economic effects of policy
actions (or inaction) (Baker et al., 2016). Therefore, EPU is a policy-related economic
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uncertainty and mainly driven by economic policy events.34
An empirical puzzle between high policy uncertainty and low financial market
volatility is documented in recent research. Pastor and Veronesi (2017) demonstrate
that there is a divergence between policy uncertainty and financialmarket uncertainty
after the GFC. I can find this divergence in Figure 1.16. The left graph in Figure 1.17
plots the policy uncertainty (EPU) and financial market uncertainty (VIX) in the US.
It is obvious to find the coexistence of lower financial market uncertainty and higher
economic policy uncertainty in the post-crisis periods. The right graph in Figure 1.16
further plots US EPU and China’s EPU. In the post-GFC, China’s EPU and US EPU
have a lower correlation than in the pre-GFC (0.34 vs. 0.68).
To compare the financial market uncertainty and policy uncertainty, I investigate
how US EPU affects China’s investment and bank loans. In light of cross-country
spillovers from China’s EPU to US EPU, I incorporate the US and China’s EPU in the
VAR(4) model, YEPUt = [EPUUSt GDPt LRt Ct BLSt BLMLt ISOEt IPOEt EPUChinat ]′.
Figure 1.18 presents the impulse responses of investment and bank loans to one
standard deviation policy uncertainty shock. The most intriguing finding is that the
US EPUwill lower SOEs’ investment in China, so the wait-and-see dynamics of SOEs’
investment reoccur in the face of a higher policy uncertainty shock. I follow Pas-
tor and Veronesi (2012) and provide an underlying mechanism to understand the re-
occurrence of the negative investment-uncertainty nexus. Pastor and Veronesi (2012)
find that the precision of political signals explains the divergence between policy un-
certainty and financial market uncertainty, and emphasize that once political signals
are observed by households and firms, they will adjust their behaviors about the gov-
ernment’s future policy decisions. Therefore, a reasonable conjecture is that political
34Applying this criterion to capture uncertainty related to economic policy, Baker et al. (2016) con-
struct the EPU index based on the newspaper coverage frequency. Specifically, Baker et al. (2016)
perform systematic searches of leading newspapers to obtain a monthly count of articles that contain
the following trio of terms: [“uncertainty” or “uncertain”], [“economic” or “economy”] and [“congress”,
“deficit”, “Federal Reserve”, “legislation”, “regulation”, or “White House”].
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signals or policy changes conveyed by economic policy uncertainty affect SOEs’ in-
vestment. Existing micro-level evidence also supports my conjecture. Consider the
political turnover as a definite political signal in China, An et al. (2016) demonstrate
that political turnover, measured by changes of government officials, leads firms to re-
duce corporate investment significantly, especially, the negative impact on investment
is much stronger for SOEs.35
1.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of US uncertainty shocks on China’s macroeconomy
and mainly focuses on investment dynamics. I uncover that the wait-and-see mech-
anism of aggregate investment in response to heightened US uncertainty disappears
in China. By performing a spate of robustness checks, I support the view that the ex-
istence of SOEs’ investment is responsible for the disappearance of the wait-and-see
mechanism of aggregate investment, which attributes to the dual goal and ownership
advantage of SOEs under China’s unique institutional background.
I further identify credit conditions via short-term and long-term bank loans and
employ the local projection approach to linkUSuncertainty shockswith credit regimes.
Under loose credit conditions, both SOEs and POEs will increase their investment in
response to a higher US uncertainty shock. During the tightening of medium- and
long-term bank loans, POEs substantially decline their investment while SOEs in-
crease their investment in the face of a higher US uncertainty shock. Therefore, even
though I introduce credit regimes, the impulse responses demonstrate the disappear-
ance of the wait-and-see dynamics of SOEs’ investment under certain circumstances.
Finally, I address an issue associated with the measure of US uncertainty and
show that economic policy uncertainty leads to a decline in state-owned enterprises’
35An et al. (2016) collect data on changes of government officials in 277 Chinese cities.
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investment due to the possible transmission of political signals.
Some caveats on the empirical conclusions should be put forward. Although it is
beyond the scope of this paper to provide a theoretical framework, it will be a future
research direction. Intuitively, I can extend China’s growth model by including two
different types of firms as Song et al. (2011b) and Shi and Zhang (2018) and different
maturities of bank loans as Chang et al. (2016) to investigate how a macro uncer-
tainty shock affects China’s economy. Besides, as discussed by Claessens et al. (2012)
and Claessens and Kose (2018), I notice that the existence of the business cycle might
strengthen the amplifying impact of the credit cycle due to their underlying linkage.
Finally, from a policy standpoint, how to eliminate the cross-country spillovers of un-
certainty shocks is still a challenge. Policymakers can reduce the adverse effects of
the cross-country uncertainty spillovers by maintaining the resilience of the real sec-




Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics
VIXUS GDP C ISOE IPOE BLS BLML LR SV
China
Mean 2.932 8.653 7.749 6.386 6.074 9.268 9.159 -2.787 2.897
Median 2.939 8.613 7.648 6.233 6.016 9.126 9.209 -2.839 2.862
Maximum 4.071 9.954 9.015 7.430 8.000 10.577 11.223 -2.115 4.097
Minimum 2.333 7.255 6.457 5.383 4.292 7.704 6.680 -3.135 2.423
Std. Dev. 0.340 0.845 0.761 0.661 1.205 0.795 1.352 0.250 0.356
Skewness 0.514 0.025 0.136 0.127 0.102 0.065 -0.186 1.148 1.292
Kurtosis 3.154 1.558 1.678 1.445 1.500 1.998 1.746 3.969 4.760
Notes: I report the summary statistics of log-level variables in this table. The sample period is from
1995Q1 to 2017Q4.
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Table 1.2 P-values of Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests
VIXUS GDP C
Intercept Only 0.075* 0.558 0.900
Intercept and Trend 0.142 0.997 0.803
LR BL
Intercept Only 0.822 0.166
Intercept and Trend 0.016** 0.132
I ISOE IPOE
Intercept Only 0.942 0.935 0.988
Intercept and Trend 0.737 0.609 0.674
BLML BLS SV
China
Intercept Only 0.373 0.457 0.238
Intercept and Trend 0.946 0.426 0.615
Notes: I only report p-values of Phillips-Perron unit root tests. To perform Phillips and Perron’s unit
root tests, I consider two specifications. The first specification only includes intercept and the second
specification includes both intercept and time trend. * and ** denote 10% and 5% significance level,
respectively.
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Table 1.3 Exogeneity Test
Granger Causality: Linear Model
Hypothesis P-value Lag Length
H0 : US Uncertainty ; China’s Uncertainty 0.0096*** 3
H0 : China’s Uncertainty ; US Uncertainty 0.5431 3
Granger Causality: Nonparametric Model
Hypothesis P-value Lag Length
H0 : US Uncertainty ; China’s Uncertainty 0.0107** 3
H0 : China’s Uncertainty ; US Uncertainty 0.2569 3
Notes: Here,;means “does not Granger cause”. The optimal lag length in the linear Granger causality
test is chosen by the Hannan-Quinn information criterion. I set the same lag length for the nonpara-
metric Granger causality. *** and ** denote 1% and 5% significance level, respectively.
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Table 1.4 Variance Decomposition of Quarterly VAR(4): US VIX
Horizons
6 18 32
Panel A: YBaselinet = [VIXUS GDPt LRt Ct BLt It SVChinat ]′
GDP 14.32 15.71 6.86
LR 13.34 25.89 25.16
C 23.33 28.58 18.44
BL 8.70 13.75 11.06
I 10.70 19.12 13.65
Panel A: YExtendt = [VIXUSt GDPt LRt Ct BLSt BLMLt ISOEt IPOEt SVChinat ]′
GDP 29.25 20.10 20.10
LR 21.48 27.99 27.04
C 31.39 40.84 23.49
BLS 0.79 11.74 14.78
BLML 8.71 21.29 14.69
ISOE 16.93 25.68 18.62
IPOE 9.31 22.55 13.29
Panel B: YGt = [VIXUSt GDPt LRt Ct BLSt BLMLt Gt ISOENGt IPOEt SVChinat ]′
GDP 34.40 14.44 10.42
LR 35.30 22.58 18.45
C 26.54 16.38 9.79
BLS 4.61 10.13 10.23
BLML 3.01 8.77 9.91
G 0.37 0.47 2.59
ISOENG 4.86 7.27 5.77
IPOE 8.42 6.26 3.58
Notes: All values in percentage. I calculate the forecast error variance decomposition of each series at
the prediction horizons of h=6, 18, 32 quarters.
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Figures
Figure 1.1 Estimation of China’s Uncertainty
Notes: SSECI represents the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index. QoQ SSECI Return repre-
sents the quarter-over-quarter return rate of the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index. I employ
Chan (2017)’s approach to estimate China’s uncertainty (SVChina) and US uncertainty (VIXUSEst). The
shaded area denotes the 2007-2009 global financial crisis.
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Figure 1.2 Time Trend of China’s Macroeconomic Variables
Notes: The top panel plots the level of the one-year PBC benchmark lending rate. The second row plots
the quarter-to-quarter log-differenced investment (state-owned enterprises and private-owned enter-
prises) and bank loans (short-term and long-term). The third row plots the quarterly variable as a
percentage of aggregate investment (or total bank loans). The shaded area denotes the 2007-2009
global financial crisis.
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Figure 1.3 Impulse Responses in VAR(4): Baseline Model
Notes: “X→Y” represents the response of variable Y to shock X. The solid lines represent the response to
one standard deviationUS uncertainty shock. The shaded areas represent 68% bootstrapped confidence
intervals. All values in percentage.
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Figure 1.4 Counterfactual Analysis I: Bank Loans Channel
Notes: “X → Y” represents the response of variable Y to shock X. The shaded areas represent 68%
bootstrapped confidence intervals. The red dashed lines plot the counterfactual response for quarterly
horizons (1 to 20) in the baseline model, in which the counterfactual responses by setting zero to the
coefficients of total bank loans (BL) to US uncertainty in the equation modeling total bank loans.
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Figure 1.5 Counterfactual Analysis II: Lending Rate Channel
Notes: “X → Y” represents the response of variable Y to shock X. The shaded areas represent 68%
bootstrapped confidence intervals. The red dashed lines plot the counterfactual response for quarterly
horizons (1 to 20) in the baseline model, in which the counterfactual responses by setting zero to the
coefficients of the benchmark lending rate (BL) to US uncertainty in the equation modeling the bench-
mark lending rate.
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Figure 1.6 Counterfactual Analysis III: Uncertainty Spillover Channel
Notes: “X → Y” represents the response of variable Y to shock X. The shaded areas represent 68%
bootstrapped confidence intervals. The red dashed lines plot the counterfactual response for quarterly
horizons (1 to 20) in the baseline model, in which the counterfactual responses by setting zero to the
coefficients of China’s uncertainty (SVChina) to US uncertainty in the equation modeling China’s uncer-
tainty.
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Figure 1.7 Impulse Responses in VAR(4): Extended Model
Notes: “X → Y” represents the response of variable Y to shock X. The shaded areas represent 68%
bootstrapped confidence intervals. All values in percentage.
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Figure 1.8 Dynamic Relationships between Investments and Bank Loans
Notes: In the Panel A, “X→ Y” represents the response of variable Y to shock X in the extended model.
The shaded areas represent 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals. All values in percentage. The Panel
B plots the correlation of HP filtered variables by using the 10-year moving window. The smoothing
parameter is 1600 for the quarterly data.
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Figure 1.9 Time Trend of G and ISOENG
Notes: This figure shows the time trend of two components of SOEs’ investment: government investment
(G) and SOEs’ investment excluding government investment (ISOENG ).
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Figure 1.10 Impulse Responses in VAR(4): the Role of Government Invest-
ment
Notes: “X→Y” represents the response of variable Y to shock X. The solid lines represent the response to
one standard deviation US uncertainty shock. I have government investment (G) and SOEs’ investment
excluding government investment. The shaded areas represent 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals.
All values in percentage.
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Figure 1.11 Impulse Responses: Local Projections
Notes: “X → Y” represents the response of variable Y to shock X using local projections. The blue lines (first column) represent the impulse
responses of the baseline VAR model, ZBaselinet = [VIXUSt GDPt LRt Ct BLt It SVChinat ]′. The red lines (second and third columns) represent the
impulse responses of the extended VAR model, ZExtendt = [VIXUSt GDPt LRt Ct BLSt BLMLt ISOEt IPOEt SVChinat ]′. The shaded areas represent
68% bootstrapped confidence intervals. All values in percentage.
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Figure 1.12 Identification of Credit Regimes
Notes: I use HP filter to extract the cyclical components of short-term bank loans (BLS) and medium-
and long-term bank loans (BLS). The smooth parameter is 1600 for the quarterly data. I construct
an indicator (ICR) based on the cyclical components of bank loans. Specifically, the positive cyclical
components correspond to credit expansions, then the indicator (ICR) takes the value of 1. The negative
cyclical components correspond to credit contractions, then the indicator (ICR) takes the value of 0.
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Figure 1.13 Impulse Responses across Credit Regimes: Local Projections
Notes: “X→ Y” represents the response of variable Y to shock X using local projections. The solid and
dashed lines represent the local projection estimation with indicator function identified by short-term
bank loans and long-term bank loans, respectively. The red and blue lines correspond to the loose and
tight credit conditions, respectively. The shaded areas represent 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals.
All values in percentage.
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Figure 1.14 Impulse Responses in VAR(4): Robustness
Notes: I consider the following robustness checks: the exclusion of the global financial crisis from 2008Q1 to 2009Q4, nominal variables, growth
rates, the reverse Cholesky order, and a different lag length (p=2).
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Figure 1.15 Identification of Credit Regimes: Smooth Transition Function
Notes: I use a smooth transition function to identify the expansion probability of bank loans (F(zt) =
1
1+exp(−θzt) , θ = 1.5), then the contraction probability of bank loans is 1 − F(zt). zt is the quarter-over-
quarter real growth rates of bank loans (BLS or BLML).
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Figure 1.16 Impulse Responses across Credit Regimes: Robustness
Notes: “X → Y” represents the response of variable Y to shock X using local projections. The solid
and dashed lines represent the local projection estimation with the expansion probability identified by
short-term bank loans and long-term bank loans, respectively. The red and blue lines correspond to the
loose and tight credit conditions, respectively. The shaded areas represent 68% bootstrapped confidence
intervals. All values in percentage.
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Figure 1.17 Time Trend of Economic Policy Uncertainty
Notes: Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) indexes of China and the US are collected from the policy uncertainty website. The correlation
between US VIX and US EPU is 0.74 before the 2007-2009 global financial crisis and 0.33 after the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. The
correlation between China’s EPU and US EPU is 0.68 before the 2007-2009 global financial crisis and 0.34 after the 2007-2009 global financial
crisis.
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Figure 1.18 Impulse Responses: Economic Policy Uncertainty
Notes: “X → Y” represents the response of variable Y to shock X. The dashed lines represent 68%
bootstrapped confidence intervals. All values in percentage.
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CHAPTER 2 Does Monetary Policy Effectively Respond to Un-
certainty Shocks? New Evidence from China
Abstract: This paper examines the time-varying responses of monetary policy to un-
certainty shocks in China. Based on China’s monetary policy regimes identified by
the narrative approach to identify China’s monetary policy regimes, the rolling sam-
ple VAR confirms the time-varying patterns of distinct monetary policy instruments in
coping with uncertainty shocks. The time-varying parameters VAR further shows that
heightened uncertainty leads to a persistent decline in the policy rate and money sup-
ply, suggesting that the interest rate is a more effective monetary policy instrument
in response to uncertainty shocks. I finally investigate the state-dependent impulse
response to monetary policy shocks under low and high states of uncertainty and find
that money supply instrument is less effective during the high uncertainty periods
while the efficacy of interest rate instrument won’t be weakened by the increasing
uncertainty. Overall, the empirical findings support the on-going transformation of
China’s monetary policy from the quantity-based to the price-based policy rule.
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Monetary policy is inevitably made in an environment of substantial uncertainty.
——— Martin Feldstein (2003)
2.1 Introduction
Uncertainty is a major concern of policymakers and shapes the monetary policy stance
(Caggiano et al., 2017a,b; Ponomareva et al., 2019), given that spillovers of higher un-
certainty to the macroeconomy crucially depend on themonetary policy reaction (Basu
and Bundick, 2015). For example, the first quarter Monetary Policy Report (MPR) in
2001 published by the People’s Bank of China (hereafter PBC) has already clearly
pointed out the unfavorable impact of uncertainty shocks on China’s macroeconomy.
Meanwhile, China’s economy has experienced remarkable structural change and insti-
tutional transformation in recent decades. This transformation not only determines
the regime-switching feature of China’s monetary policy (Klingelhöfer and Sun, 2018)
but also affects the effectiveness of countercyclical monetary policy for China’s real
activity and inflation (Fernald et al., 2014). Therefore, based on China’s institutional
background, this paper investigates the time-varying impacts of uncertainty shocks
on multiple monetary policy objectives and understand how distinct monetary policy
instruments respond to uncertainty shocks in different monetary policy regimes.
In theory, monetary policy plays a key role in offsetting the negative impact of un-
certainty shocks (Bachmann and Bayer, 2013; Basu and Bundick, 2015; Leduc and
Liu, 2016; Basu and Bundick, 2017). Basu and Bundick (2015) conclude that an un-
constrained central bank (no zero lower bound) is able to stabilize real activity and
inflation using its nominal policy rate in response to declines in aggregate demand
caused by uncertainty shock. Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2018) further show that active
monetary policy can explain the dampened real effects of uncertainty shock. Empirical
evidence strongly supports the theoretical results (Choi, 2013, 2017; Caggiano et al.,
2017a,b; Aastveit et al., 2017). Choi (2013) finds that negative short-run effects of un-
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certainty shock disappeared after 1983 and conjectures that an improved monetary
policy framework as a potential explanation for the declining effects of uncertainty
shock on output. Caggiano et al. (2017b) investigate the role played by US systematic
monetary policy in coping with the real effects of uncertainty shocks in recessions and
expansions and demonstrate that the effectiveness of US systematic monetary policy
in the aftermath of an uncertainty shock is greater in expansions.
However, it is worth noting that these theoretical and empirical findings are based
on theUS experience, seldom studies ever investigate howmonetary policy responds to
uncertainty shocks based on China’s experience. From the perspective of institutional
arrangements, monetary policy in China is different from that in the US in three key
aspects. First, China’s monetary policy is gradually shifting from the quantity-based
rule to the price-based rule.36 The prerequisite for the effectiveness of quantity-based
rule is that the central bank can effectively control the money supply. Specifically, the
central bank controls the amount of money and in turn affects the real economy. After
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the PBC applied M2 growth as a valid way to con-
trol bank loans and to maintain economic growth. A direct outcome of targeting M2
growth led to an investment-driven economy (Chen and Zha, 2018). However, the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy controlling the money supply growth is weakened after the
2007-2009 global financial crisis. On the one hand, after the interest rate liberaliza-
tion, the relationship between money supply and output gradually disappears, which
is an important reason for changing the intermediate goal of monetary policy (Ma,
2020). One the other hand, with the deepening of financial reform, a large number of
newly created financial products (financial innovation) that replace deposits continue
to emerge, which intensifies the uncontrollability of money supply. For instance, the
rise of shadow banking implies a noticeable divergence between money supply and
36The monetary policy controlling money supply growth as an intermediate target is known as the
quantity-based rule (the McCallum rule). The monetary policy controlling the interest rate as an in-
termediate target is a price-based rule (the Taylor rule or interest-rate-based rule).
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bank loans (Chen et al., 2018).37 Therefore, the PBC first abandoned the concrete tar-
get of money supply growth in 2018. More importantly, the 13th Five-Year Plan for
Economic and Social Development in 2016 as the top-level blueprint states that the
central bank should establish forward guidance mechanisms for target interest rates
and interest rate corridors and emphasized a gradual transition from the quantity-
based framework to the interest-rate based framework.
Second, after the global financial crisis in 2008, monetary policy in the US has
been constrained by the zero lower bound, while China’s nominal interest rates have
a certain space from the zero lower bound (Zhang and Pan, 2019). This allows the
central bank in China to lower the benchmark interest rate to spur economic growth
and achieve other policy objectives more flexibly. Third, the Chinese government has
strict controls over the capital account and paysmore attention tomassive cross-border
capital flows. When the central bank implements monetary policy in response to an
increase in uncertainty, the imperfect capital mobility avoids a tradeoff between capi-
tal outflows and output contraction. “Fear of capital flows” happensmore frequently in
emerging market economies (EMEs). Bhattarai et al. (2019) construct a fifteen EMEs
panel excluding China and attribute the heterogeneous responses of macroeconomic
variables to differential EME monetary policy response in the face of heightened un-
certainty. In particular, Bhattarai et al. (2019) conclude that the effectiveness of the
monetary policy of EMEs in mitigating the negative impact of uncertainty shocks on
output depends on the concern about capital outflows. Therefore, in light of the regu-
lated capital account as a special arrangement in China, there is no tradeoff between
the lower interest rate and massive capital outflows.
Therefore, based on the above policy facts, to better understand how monetary
policy effectively responds to uncertainty shocks in China, I first use the narrative ap-
37Shadow banking encompasses all credit outside the formal bank sector (or off-balance sheet ac-
tivities), including wealth management products, entrusted lending, trusted lending, and bank accep-
tances.
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proach to identify China’s monetary policy regimes. Next, I estimate the rolling sam-
ple and time-varying parameters vector autoregression models (rolling sample VAR
and TVP-VAR) because these flexible specifications can link the time-varying mone-
tary policy reactions with the identified monetary policy regimes. The results show
that the interest rate gradually becomes a more effective monetary policy variable in
tackling heightened uncertainty compared to the money supply instrument. Addi-
tionally, I apply the historical decomposition to study the contribution of uncertainty
and monetary policy shocks to changes in monetary policy objectives (GDP growth
and inflation rate) and find that changes in GDP growth and inflation rate are mainly
explained by uncertainty and interest rate shocks after 2012, which to some extent re-
flects the on-going transformation of China’s monetary policy from the quantity-based
to the price-based rule. Finally, I investigate the state-dependent impulse responses to
monetary policy shocks under low and high levels of uncertainty and find that money
supply instrument is less effective during the high uncertainty periods while the ef-
ficacy of interest rate instrument won’t be weakened by the increasing uncertainty.
Overall, the empirical findings support the on-going transformation of China’s mone-
tary policy from the quantity-based to the price-based policy rule.
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, this paper comple-
ments empirical literature on uncovering the dynamic relationship between monetary
policy and uncertainty shocks (Leduc and Liu, 2016; Caggiano et al., 2017a; Aastveit
et al., 2017; Mumtaz and Theodoridis, 2018; Bhattarai et al., 2019; Ponomareva et al.,
2019). Leduc and Liu (2016) demonstrate that an uncertainty shock acts like a nega-
tive aggregate demand shock and further argue that monetary policy accommodates
heightened uncertainty by lowering the nominal interest rate. Choi (2017) empiri-
cally confirms that a loose monetary policy usually follows uncertainty shocks while
the size of the monetary policy response varies over time. Mumtaz and Theodoridis
(2018) also reveal that monetary authorities cut the policy rate quickly to deal with
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the adverse real activity effects of uncertainty shocks and to reduce the magnitude
of the decline in output and asset prices. Second, this paper is associated with previ-
ous studies on discussing the selection of the optimal monetary policy rule in China
(Fan et al., 2011; Fernald et al., 2014; Nuutilainen, 2015; Chen et al., 2017; Li and
Liu, 2017; Zhang, 2019). Fernald et al. (2014) employ a factor-augmented vector au-
toregression to study the effectiveness of China’s monetary policy and reveal that the
central-bank-determined changes in China’s interest rate rather than the money sup-
ply have substantial impacts on economic activity and inflation. Third, this paper
enriches the research on the evolving impacts of uncertainty shocks over different eco-
nomic periods and policy regimes (Choi, 2013, 2017; Mumtaz and Theodoridis, 2018).
In the existing research, Choi and Shim (2019) make a good attempt to gauge the re-
sponses of monetary policy to uncertainty shocks in China, but they fail to consider
how uncertainty shocks affect monetary policy in different policy regimes. In addition,
Choi and Shim (2019) only discuss the responsiveness of the interest rate and ignore
the reaction of the money supply instrument to uncertainty shocks.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the institutional back-
ground. Section 2.3 explains the data source and performs the preliminary analysis.
Section 2.4 identifies China’s monetary policy regimes. Section 2.5 discusses the em-
pirical framework, including rolling sample VAR and TVP-VAR models. Section 2.6
analyzes the main results and looks more closely at the evolving responses to uncer-
tainty shocks. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
In this section, I briefly outline the institutional background of monetary policy in
China and provide some useful context for further analysis.38
38For more details on China’s monetary policy, Chen and Zha (2018) and Huang et al. (2020) are two
good references.
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According to theLaw of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China
(PBC law) introduced in 1995, the Peoples’ Bank of China (PBC) is the central bank in
China under the leadership of the State Council. Article 3 in the PBC law states that
The aim of monetary policies is to maintain the stability of the value of the currency
and thereby promote economic growth. Therefore, three explicit policy objectives of the
PBC include supporting economic growth, controlling the price level, and maintaining
the stability of the RMB exchange rate.39
Before 1984, the PBC has been serving as the a central bank and also as a com-
mercial bank. After that, four state-owned commercial banks (Bank of China, China
Industrial and Commercial Bank, China Construction Bank, and Agricultural Bank
of China) are established to undertake the stripped bank services from the PBC. At the
start of 1984, the PBC became a key player in monetary policymaking and financial
regulation.
Since the onset of reform and opening up in the late 1970s, China has been under-
going a transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy.
From 1984 to 1998, monetary policy conducted by the PBC is a broad definition. The
monetary policy also includes credit policy, which aims at achieving specific economic
targets under the planned economy. From 1998 to 2017, the PBC used a target of
growth rates of M2 supply as an effective way to control aggregate bank loans and
promote an investment-driven economy. In 2018Q1, for the first time since 1998, the
M2 growth target was no longer among the government’s key economic objects. The
2019:II Monetary Policy Report states that “From the beginning of 2019, following the
policy arrangements of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, the PBC
pursued a sound monetary policy, deepened financial supply-side structural reforms,
and maintained steady credit growth.” Figure 2.1 from Huang et al. (2020) summa-
39In practice, the PBC has multiple policy objectives, including growth, employment, inflation, exter-
nal account balance, economic reform, industrial structure, household welfare, and financial stability
(Huang et al., 2020).
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rizes the monetary policy framework in China.
2.3 Data and Preliminary Statistics
Among the distinct measures of uncertainty proposed in recent studies, I employ eco-
nomic policy uncertainty (EPU) in China as a proxy variable of uncertainty, which
keeps in line with Aastveit et al. (2017), Choi and Shim (2019), and Choi and Yoon
(2019). EPU is the preferred measure of uncertainty in this study, because stock mar-
ket volatility, another popular uncertaintymeasure, contains information on risk aver-
sion in addition to uncertainty (Bekaert et al., 2013). Choi (2017) points out that the
use of EPU can to some extent mitigate this issue because of the different approach
used to construct EPU.40 A potential endogenous interaction between uncertainty, fi-
nancialmarkets, andmonetary policy should be addressedwhen using financial uncer-
tainty (Caldara et al., 2016). Specifically, financial uncertainty is measured through
the stock market, so when I use financial uncertainty from the financial market to
investigate how monetary policy responds to uncertainty shocks, this will make it dif-
ficult to identify the effect of uncertainty shocks from that of financial shocks. As for
the economic policy uncertainty, this proxy of uncertainty is constructed on the basis
of newspaper coverage frequency and has a lower correlation with financial markets
in comparison to financial uncertainty.
EPU gauges uncertainty about who will make economic policy decisions, what eco-
nomic policy actions will be undertaken and when, and the economic effects of policy
actions (or inaction) (Baker et al., 2016). The EPU index is constructed based on the
newspaper coverage frequency. Baker et al. (2016) perform systematic searches of
leading newspapers to obtain amonthly count of articles that contain the following trio
of terms: [“uncertainty” or “uncertain”], [“economic” or “economy”] and [“congress”,
40I find that the main conclusions are robust even when I use realized stock market volatility as a
proxy of uncertainty.
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“deficit”, “Federal Reserve”, “legislation”, “regulation”, or “White House”]. In view of
more strict censorship and government control of media and newspaper, Baker et al.
(2016) choose South ChinaMorning Post issued in Hong Kong and add [“Beijing or au-
thorities”] in the term sets to develop China’s EPU index, which is known as BBD-type
index.41
Following Fernald et al. (2014), Chen and Zha (2018), andBasu andBundick (2017),
I consider two observable measures of monetary policy instruments, incorporating the
central bank policy rate and money supply. I collect the central bank policy rate mea-
sured by the one-year benchmark lending rate from the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS).42 The money supply gauged by the broad money supply (M2) is collected
from the WIND database.43
To capture the state of the Chinese macroeconomy, I use the monthly GDP and CPI
index from China’s Macroeconomy: Time Series Data maintained by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Atlanta.44 In the succeeding estimation, I use the year-over-year GDP
growth rate as Lien et al. (2019) and the year-over-year inflation rate to be consistent
with the specification in estimating the monetary policy rule. Additionally, following
Choi (2017), I add the crude oil price ofWest Texas Intermediate in the empiricalmodel
to control for the external supply factor. In sum, I have the year-over-year GDP growth
rate (GDP), inflation rate (INF), and money supply growth rate (M2), the log level of
uncertainty (UNC) and global oil price (OIL), and the level of the central bank policy
41See the EPU website for more details: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/index.html.
42The one-year benchmark lending rate is regarded as the policy rate in China (Nuutilainen, 2015).
Although Shi et al. (2018) point out that the one-year deposit rate is the benchmark rate that the PBC
administers in China and the PBC sets the one-year lending rate by adding a proper wedge to cover the
operational costs of banks based on the one-year deposit rate. A recent reform that the People’s Bank of
China (PBC) announced the new formation mechanism of loan prime rate (LPR) in August 2019 shows
that one-year benchmark lending rate will be an ideal proxy of the policy rate in China.
43Wind created by the company WIND Co. Ltd. is a data information system.
44The monthly data is constructed by Higgins et al. (2016). For GDP, they interpolate seasonally
adjusted quarterly nominal GDP value added with seasonally adjusted monthly nominal retail sales
of consumer goods, nominal exports, nominal imports, and nominal value added of industry. For CPI,
they seasonally adjust the monthly consumer price index series using the X-12 ARIMA method with
regression dummies to account for the Chinese New Year effect.
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rate (PR). The sample period is from 1997M1 to 2018M12. During this period, mone-
tary policy plays a crucial role in promoting overall economic growth in China, whereas
the credit policy dominates the monetary policy in affecting the economy before 1997
(Chen and Zha, 2018; Huang et al., 2020). The summary statistics are presented in
Table 2.1.
2.4 Identification of Monetary Policy Regimes
To identify monetary policy shifts in China, I extend the monetary policy stance in-
dicator based on the narrative approach (Sun, 2013; Klingelhöfer and Sun, 2018; Sun
et al., 2018). Changes in this indicator reflect the PBC’s decisions in adjusting its
monetary policy stance and the PBC’s response to the incoming information on real
activity and inflation.45
I use the quarterly meetings of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and the
quarterly Monetary Policy Report (MPR) to extract the policy stance on implementing
the expansionary/contractionary monetary policy through textual analysis.46
Specifically, the monetary policy stance indicator is a five-value variable, including
2 (very easy monetary policy), 1 (easy monetary policy), 0 (neutral monetary policy), -1
(tight monetary policy uncertainty), and -2 (very tight monetary policy). For example,
if the MPR and the MPC meetings convey the strong emphasis on real growth, such
as “loose monetary policy”, “critical time for economic development”, and “appropri-
ately increase money supply”, I set the value to 2 as very easy monetary policy stance.
For the easy (not very easy) monetary policy, I can identify it through the words like
“appropriately adjust money supply”.47
45The narrative analysis has been an effective way to identify monetary policy regimes and stance,
e.g., Caggiano et al. (2017a) and Bhattarai et al. (2019).
46Monetary Policy Committee, in which the members include the PBC governor, senior officials of
various economic ministries and agencies, and several academic experts, only plays an advisory role in
formulating monetary policy. Monetary Policy Report is a quarterly executive report of monetary policy
in China.
47More details on the classification criteria to identify the monetary stance indicator, referring to
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Figure 2.2 depicts the monetary policy stance indicator and the time trend of M2
growth and the policy rate. I consider three salient episodes (2004M4-2004M6, 2007M7-
2008M6, and 2011M4-2011M9) to explain how the narrative approach well identifies
the monetary policy stance of the PBC. The first period is from 2004M4 To 2006M6.
The steadily rapid growth of money stock in 2002 and 2003 resulted in inflation as a
real risk in 2004. Therefore, the PBC agreed that the contractionary monetary policy
should be adopted in the coming periods. The second period is from 2007M7-2008M6.
Before the global financial crisis, the PBC had more concern about inflation due to
more-than-expected growth of money and bank lending and repeatedly emphasized
that a tight monetary policy should be implemented. The third period is from 2011M4
to 2011M9. The PBC reemphasized that monetary policy should attach top priority
to inflation control. During these periods, the PBC conveys a contractionary policy
stance, correspondingly, the monetary policy stance indicator is a negative value.
To further understand the monetary policy regimes over time identified via the
narrative approach, I will use the monetary policy rules estimated by Nuutilainen
(2015) to briefly illustrate the monetary stance over time and the effectiveness of the
selected rule in achieving the ultimate goal of monetary policy. By estimating a time-
varying estimation procedure, Nuutilainen (2015) concludes that the two monetary
policy objectives are generally assigned to different instruments. The money supply
instrument continues to be utilized to control the price level. Since 2008, the interest
rate instrument has been mainly used to achieve the targeted output growth. There-
fore, the money supply growth set by the central bank gradually departs from the
monetary policy objectives (GDP growth and inflation rate) while the interest rate set
by the central bank will follow the interest rate rule, which coincides with the trans-
formation of China’s monetary policy from the quantity-based rule to the price-based
rule.
Sun et al. (2018).
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2.5 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I start with the rolling sample VAR and then present the time-varying
parameters VAR (TVP-VAR) with stochastic volatility as a complementary estimation
strategy to confirm the empirical results from the rolling sample VAR.
2.5.1 Rolling Sample VAR





FkYt−k + ut (1)
where Yt = [OILt GDPt INFt M2t PRt UNCt]′ in the SVARmodel. Asmentioned before,
GDP, INF, and M2 are year-over-year growth rates. Policy rate (PR) is the level vari-
able. Uncertainty (UNC) and global oil price (OIL) are the log level variables. Fk is the
coefficient matrix and ut is a vector of structural shocks. The selection of variables is
consistent with Nakajima et al. (2011) and Choi (2017). I also incorporate the money
supply as Fernald et al. (2014) and Basu and Bundick (2017) because the PBC relies
on the money supply instrument to adjust the economy. Referring to Nakajima et al.
(2011), the lag length (p) is set to 4.48
I set the Cholesky order as OIL→ GDP→ INF→ M2→ PR→ UNC in the model.
This ordering defines a Cholesky identification that is underpinned by existing em-
pirical evidence. I allow macroeconomic and policy variables have contemporaneous
effects on uncertainty, indicating that uncertainty has an endogenous response to all
other variables as suggested by Plante et al. (2018) and Ludvigson et al. (2020) rather
than an exogenous driver. Following Fernald et al. (2014) and Basu and Bundick
(2015), I assume a typical recursive ordering with the economic activity and inflation
ordered first. Specifically, policy variables react endogenously to changes in economic
48Figure 2.16 in Appendix 2.A shows that the main findings are insensitive to the selection of the lag
length.
90
activity and inflation, but policy innovations affect economic activity and inflation with
a lag. I also have the global oil price controlling for the external supply factor that has




a11 0 · · · 0
a21 a22 0 0
... ... ... 0
an1 ... ann−1 ann






−1Σεt εt ∼ N(0, I) (2)
where βk = A−1Fk and Σεt = Aut, so the matrix A−1 maps the structural shocks εt
into the reduced-form residuals ut and
Σ =

σ1 0 · · · 0
0 σ2 0 0
... ... ... 0
0 ... 0 σn

where σi is the standard deviation of each identified structural shock.
To construct the rolling sample VAR, I estimate the first VAR model in the initial
sample with a fixed window length (60 months). The subsequent VARs add one ob-
servation value at a time and drop an initial observation to keep the window length
constant. The sample length is from 1997M1 to 2018M12, so the first rolling sample
is from 1997M1-2001M12 and the last rolling sample is from 2014M1-2018M12. The
sequences of the rolling sample VAR are specified as follows
Sample 1: 1997M1-2001M12 Yt =
∑p
k=1 βkYt−k + A
−1Σut
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Sample 2: 1997M2-2002M1 Yt =
∑p
k=1 βkYt−k + A
−1Σut
Sample 3: 1997M3-2002M2 Yt =
∑p
k=1 βkYt−k + A
−1Σut
...
Sample 205: 2014M1-2018M12 Yt =
∑p
k=1 βkYt−k + A
−1Σut
I have two reasons for selecting the 5-year (60 months) window length. First, a
relatively short window length captures the rapid institutional transformation and
structural change in China’s economy and detects changes in policy conduct (Nuuti-
lainen, 2015). Second, a 5-year sample length keeps consistent with the Five-Year
Plan, which is regarded as the top-level policy blueprint to determine policy shifts
in China.49 Therefore, this approach not only enables me to estimate the dynamic
trends of unknown parameters in a simple way but also avoids strong assumptions in
terms of intensive parameters. In addition, I only plot two dimensions (horizons and
responses) in the SVAR model, whereas in the rolling sample VAR, it is feasible to
plot three dimensions (years, horizons, and responses) to visualize the time-varying
patterns of impulse responses.
2.5.2 Time-varying Parameters VAR (TVP-VAR)
I employ the TVP-VAR model with stochastic volatility proposed by Primiceri (2005)
and Nakajima et al. (2011) to complement the empirical results of the rolling sample







where At is a lower triangular matrix and Σt is the diagonal matrix. By rewriting the






49The results of the rolling sample VAR are invariant to a longer window length (120 months).
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represents the Kronecker product. Be-
cause all parameters have a time subscript, thus the coefficients βt and the parameters
At and Σt are all time varying. Let αt be the vector of non-zero and non-one elements
of matrix At (stacked by row) and σt be the vector of elements of matrix Σt. The time-
varying parameters (βt, αt, and ht) are specified as follows
βt = βt−1 + vt αt = αt−1 + ξt ht = ht−1 + ηt ht = lnσ
2
t
All innovations in the TVP-VAR model are assumed to be jointed normally dis-










In 0 · · · 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 T

where In is an n× n identity matrix, while Q, S, and T are positive definite matrices.
Referring to Primiceri (2005) and Nakajima et al. (2011), I further assume that the
shocks to the innovations of the time-varying parameters are uncorrelated among the
parameters βt, αt, and ht, which improve the efficiency of the sampling algorithm. The
Markov ChainMonte Carlo (MCMC) approach is used to estimate the TVP-VARmodel
with stochastic volatility as described in Primiceri (2005) and Nakajima et al. (2011).
The goal of the MCMC methods is to evaluate the joint posterior distribution of the
parameters of interest under certain prior probability densities set in advance. Given
data, I can repeatedly sample a Markov chain whose invariant (stationary) distribu-
tion is the posterior distribution.
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2.6 Empirical Results
In this section, I first present the empirical results of the rolling sample VAR and
TVP-VAR. Next, I turn to use the historical decomposition to explore the contribution
of uncertainty and monetary policy shocks to shifts in monetary policy objectives. Fi-
nally, I further discuss the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks under high
and low levels of uncertainty.
2.6.1 Rolling Sample Analysis
Full Sample Results As a diagnostic attempt, I first estimate the reduced VAR
in equation (2). The full sample analysis as a traditional approach masks the time-
varying impacts of uncertainty shocks, but it delivers results comparable with the
existing literature (Choi and Shim, 2019; Bhattarai et al., 2019). The full sample
impulse responses are plotted in Figure 2.3.
Regarding the monetary policy objectives, a positive standard deviation uncer-
tainty shock lowers GDP growth and inflation rate. Therefore, the full sample analy-
sis supports the view that an uncertainty shock is a negative aggregate demand shock
(Leduc and Liu, 2016; Basu and Bundick, 2017). Also, the PBC immediately cuts the
policy rate in response to heightened uncertainty, which is in line with the existing
studies based on the US and other countries (Bachmann and Bayer, 2013; Caggiano
et al., 2017a,b; Choi, 2017). An only exception in Figure 2.3 is the response of money
supply growth. Specifically, a higher uncertainty shock slightly lowers the money sup-
ply growth in the first two months and then raises it after that, indicating the sluggish
responses of the money supply instruments.50 However, the response of money supply
to uncertainty shocks is not significant from zero.
Figure 2.4 plots the forecast error variance decomposition at the prediction hori-
50In contrast, Basu and Bundick (2017) document that theM2money stock will increase immediately
in response to heightened uncertainty in the US.
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zons from 1 to 20 months. At the prediction horizon of h = 20, uncertainty shocks
account for 10%, 25%, 60%, and 80% of movements in GDP growth, inflation rate,
money supply growth, and policy rate, respectively. Therefore, uncertainty shocks do
play an important role in accounting for the fluctuations in monetary policy objectives
and instruments at business cycle frequencies. Finally, I consider a battery of robust-
ness checks, including (i) a different lag length (p=6), (ii) a different proxy variable
(realized stock market volatility as in Choi and Shim (2019)), (iii) reversed Cholesky
ordering, (iv) the log-level variables rather than growth rates. Figure 2.5 shows the
results of robustness checks, and the empirical results are insensitive to the model
specification and variable transformation. Although the magnitudes of the responses
are different, the directions of impulse response functions always keep consistent.
Rolling Sample Results To shed light on the time-varying impacts of uncer-
tainty shocks, I turn to the rolling sample VAR. In theory, there is no approach to
determine the optimal window length, so I consider the Five-Year Plan as the legacy
from the planned economy in China and use a rolling sample of 60 months as a bench-
mark.
Figure 2.6 visualizes the three-dimensional impulse responses indexed by the end
date of each rolling sample and by the horizons from 1 month to 20 months. Figure
2.7 plots the snapshots of impulse responses at the horizon of 2-month because the
maximum impact of uncertainty shocks in the full sample analysis often occurs two
months after the shock. Figure 2.8 plots the snapshots of impulse responses at the
horizon of 4-month as a comparison. To facilitate the subsequent analysis, I divide
the time-varying impacts of uncertainty shocks into five subperiods. According to the
critical points of monetary policy and financial institutions reform in China, I divide
the full sample into four subperiods, including 1997M1-2006M12, 2007M1-2011M12,
2012M1-2015M12, and 2016M1-2018M12. Periods I and II roughly correspond to pe-
riod 1 in Table 2.2. Period III roughly corresponds to the period 2 in Table 2.2. Period
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IV roughly corresponds to period 3 and period V corresponds to period 4 in Table 2.2.
The first cutoff point is 2007 because China had a compulsory foreign exchange settle-
ment before 2007, meaning that exporters are required to sell their foreign exchange
earnings to banks, the PBC had to passively increase the base money supply (Wang,
2020).51 The second cutoff point is 2012 because the PBC established a self-regulatory
pricing mechanism of market interest rate in mid-2012 as a key step of interest rate
liberalization (Ma, 2020). The third cutoff point is 2016 because, on the one hand, most
administrative restrictions (ceilings and floors) on deposit and lending rates had been
lifted after a series of reforms since the 1990s; on the other hand, the PBC introduced
a macro-prudential assessment (MPA) framework for safeguarding financial stability
at the beginning of 2016.
I first discuss howuncertainty shocks affectmonetary policy objectives (GDP growth
and inflation rate). Although themagnitude of uncertainty shocks on the inflation rate
is variable in different periods, heightened uncertainty always has a deflationary im-
pact except for the temporary and insignificant inflationary impact before the global
financial crisis. Furthermore, the impacts of increased uncertainty on GDP growth
exhibit more substantial time-varying features in China, but empirical evidence on
advanced economies shows that there are long-run persistent negative impacts of un-
certainty shocks on GDP since the 1990s (Choi, 2017; Mumtaz and Theodoridis, 2018).
At the horizon of 2-month, I show that the impact of uncertainty shocks onGDP growth
turns from positive to negative and then to positive. In particular, uncertainty shocks
lose their negative impact on GDP growth rate after 2012, indicating that the wait-
and-see dynamics of output disappear in China. As Choi (2013) points out, a regime
switch in the monetary policy might be a potential explanation of the disappearance
51In addition, the PBC rebuilt a new interbank market in 2007 and the Shanghai Interbank Offered
Rate (SHIBOR) became an important parameter for measuring liquidity conditions in the interbank
market, which marks the short-term interest rate as either the key monetary policy tool or the opera-
tional target in the next step (Huang et al., 2020).
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of the wait-and-see mechanism.52
Motivated byChoi (2013), I turn to investigate howmonetary policy instruments re-
spond to uncertainty shocks. In particular, I attempt to link monetary policy regimes
and stance with the impact of uncertainty shocks, in a similar manner of Caggiano
et al. (2017a) and Bhattarai et al. (2019).53 During the periods I and II, money supply
increases while the policy rate reduces in response to heightened uncertainty, imply-
ing that the PBC will take a loose monetary policy. In the meanwhile, I notice that
the negative effect of uncertainty shocks on GDP growth has gradually declined, and
uncertainty shocks only generate mild deflationary effects. Based on the monetary
policy regimes identified by Nuutilainen (2015), only the quantity-based rule holds in
China during this period. Therefore, I conclude that the money supply instrument can
effectively offset the negative impact of uncertainty shocks during the periods I and
II.
Next, I turn to discuss howmonetary policy variables respond to uncertainty shocks
during the periods III and IV. During the third period, in response to uncertainty
shocks, the money supply growth decreases and the policy rate keeps stable except for
a sharp decline during the global financial crisis. During the fourth period, both the
money supply growth and interest rate increase. The contradictory reactions of dif-
ferent monetary policy instruments to uncertainty shocks reflect the policy operations
of the PBC that assign distinct instruments to the monetary policy objectives (Nuuti-
lainen, 2015). Based on the Nuutilainen (2015), I uncover that the quantity-based rule
targets GDP growth while the price-based rule targets inflation during this period. To
sum up, the divergence of policy rules interprets the empirical findings that a higher
policy rate tends to lower inflation while a rising money supply tends to elevate GDP
52Choi (2013) replicates Bloom (2009)’s results and notes that the post-1983 data in the US fail to
exhibit the wait-and-see dynamics.
53I mainly analyze the impulse responses at the horizon of 2-month. Different from GDP growth
and inflation rate, the money supply and policy rate have more consistent responses to heightened
uncertainty at the horizon of 2-month and 4-month.
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growth.
Finally, I investigate how monetary policy instruments respond to uncertainty
shocks after 2015 (period V). During this period, the accelerated interest rate liber-
alization and the gradual establishment of the price-based policy rule occur simulta-
neously. In accordance with the shifts of monetary policy regimes, the money supply
reduces in response to uncertainty shocks but the policy rate declines steadily. I also
notice that GDP growth has a slightly positive response, which partly attributes to
the fact that the price-based rule targets GDP growth. Overall, the empirical findings
from the rolling sample VAR confirm the time-varying performance of distinct mone-
tary policy instruments in coping with the negative impact of uncertainty shocks and
highlight the shifts of monetary policy regimes in China. Therefore, the time-varying
responses of monetary policy instruments to uncertainty shocks support the on-going
transformation of China’s monetary policy to the price-based rule and show that the
evolving process of setting the intermediate monetary target in China keeps a similar
trajectory as the US.54
To gauge the role of uncertainty shocks in explaining fluctuations in monetary pol-
icy objectives and instruments, Figure 2.9 presents the forecast error variance decom-
position from the rolling sample VAR. From top to bottom, I plot the contribution of
uncertainty shocks tomovements in GDP growth, inflation rate, money supply growth,
and policy rate at the prediction horizon of 20. Here, I mainly focus on how uncertainty
shocks account for fluctuations in monetary policy variables. It is evident that uncer-
tainty plays a crucial role in explaining movements in money supply growth around
2016, more than 50%. From 2008 to 2012, uncertainty shocks also account for around
20% of movements in the money supply growth. In addition, I note that uncertainty
shocks explain more fluctuations in the policy rate from 2012 to 2014.
54Benati and Mumtaz (2007) and Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2018) summarize that, after a break-
down in the connection between money aggregates and the real economy, the Fed shifted its focus from
narrow to broad money and finally to the short-term interest rate as its monetary policy instrument in
response to macroeconomic uncertainty.
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2.6.2 Evidence from TVP-VAR
In this section, I estimate a TVP-VAR model with stochastic volatility to examine
whether the results based on a more tightly parameterized model can confirm the
findings from the rolling sample VAR. I draw 10000 samples to compute the posterior
estimates after abandoning the initial 1000 samples as a burn-in period for conver-
gence. I set the lag length to 4 in the TVP-VAR as the rolling sample VAR, and further
assume that Σβ is a diagonal matrix in this study for simplicity. Primiceri (2005) and
Nakajima et al. (2011) indicate that this assumption is not sensitive to the results in
comparison to the non-diagonal assumption. The following priors are assumed for the
ith diagonals of the covariance matrices
(Σβ)
−2
i ∼ Gamma(40, 0.02), (Σα)−2i ∼ Gamma(4, 0.02), (Σh)−2i ∼ Gamma(4, 0.02)
For the initial states of the time-varying parameters, I have µβ0 = µα0 = µh0 = 0
and Σβ0 = Σα0 = Σh0 = 10 × I. Figure 2.10 reports the estimation results for selected
parameters in the TVP-VAR model. After I discard the samples in the burn-in period
(initial 1000 samples), the sample autocorrelation drops sharply and the sample paths
look stable, suggesting that the MCMC algorithm produces posterior draws efficiently.
To focus on the time-varying responses of monetary policy objectives and instru-
ments to heightened uncertainty, I consider the responses over time by fixing the hori-
zon at 2 months. Figure 2.11 presents the posterior mean responses in GDP growth,
inflation rate, money supply growth, and policy rate by giving one standard deviation
uncertainty shock at the horizon of 2-month. Also, I plot the responses at the horizon
of 4-month as a comparison. The impulse responses of policy variables obtained from
the TVP-VAR model exhibit a similar trend to the full sample VAR analysis, albeit
with more gradual changes and more consistent negative responses. These gradual
changes are mainly caused by the random walk assumption that characterizes the
process for the time-varying parameters in the TVP-VAR model (Choi, 2017). Unlike
99
the time-varying responses in the rolling sample VAR, both monetary policy objectives
(GDP growth and inflation rate) and monetary policy instruments (money supply and
policy rate) negatively respond to uncertainty shocks during the sample period.
Different from the results of my TVP-VAR analysis, Choi and Shim (2019) conclude
that the ability of central banks to cut the short-term policy rate is limited in EMEs
due to the fear of capital flow reversals. Bhattarai et al. (2019) further divide EMEs
into two groups (Latin American and non-Latin American) and analyze EME central
bank minutes on controlling capital flows through the narrative approach. Bhattarai
et al. (2019) summarize that non-Latin American EMEs pay greater attention to cap-
ital flows and have a relatively more tight monetary policy by raising short-term in-
terest rates in response to uncertainty shocks.55 It is worth pointing out that most
EMEs in Choi and Shim (2019) and Bhattarai et al. (2019) allow free cross-border
capital flows, which give rise to a tradeoff between capital outflows and output con-
traction and weaken the effectiveness of monetary policy in mitigating the negative
impact of uncertainty shocks. However, given the fact that the Chinese government
has direct controls over the capital account and international capital mobility, these
regulations avoid the realization of capital outflows when the central bank lowers the
policy rate. Therefore, the impulse responses based on the TVP-VAR model uncover
that the interest rate is a more effective monetary policy instrument in responding to
the negative impact of uncertainty shocks compared to the money supply instrument,
which also supports the underway transformation of China’s monetary policy to the
price-based rule.
55Bhattarai et al. (2019) also find that Latin American EMEs pay less attention to smoothing capital




Historical decomposition depicts the portion of the deviation of variables of interest
from its unconditional mean driven by different types of structural shocks in each
period. Following Choi (2018) and Caldara et al. (2016), to understand whether the
contribution of the uncertainty and monetary policy shocks to changes in monetary
policy objectives does vary over time, I plot the historical decomposition of GDP growth
and inflation rate in Figure 2.12 and Figure 2.13, respectively. Obviously, I find that
money supply shock drives more GDP growth and inflation from 2004 to 2012. After
the establishment of a self-regulatory pricing mechanism of market interest rate in
2012 as a crucial step in the process of interest rate liberalization (Ma, 2020), money
supply shock in pushing GDP growth and inflation rate becomes negligible compared
to the interest rate shock. The coexistence of uncertainty and interest rate shocks in
the historical decomposition after 2012 reflects that the interest rate gradually plays
a crucial role in targeting the monetary policy objectives, in particular, the interest
rate becomes the dominant policy instrument in coping with the uncertainty shock.
2.6.4 State-dependent Impulse Responses: Monetary Policy Shocks
In the preceding analysis, based on the monetary policy identified through the narra-
tive approach, I explore the time-varying responses of monetary policy instruments
to uncertainty shocks. In this section, to further uncover the policy-effectiveness and
uncertainty, following Aastveit et al. (2017), I examine the impact of monetary policy
to change with the degree of uncertainty by interacting monetary policy instruments
(money supply and policy rate) with uncertainty. Specifically, I estimate an interacted
structural VAR model, in which time-variation in policy influence is directly linked to
uncertainty, in contrast to time-varying parameter VAR models used in the previous
section.
101







BkZt−kUNCt−k + ηt (5)
where Zt = [OILt GDPt INFt M2t PRt]′, hence Zt is Yt excluding the uncertainty in
the equation (2). ηt is a vector of reduced form residuals at time t. To compute im-
pulse responses to monetary policy shocks under different degree of uncertainty, I
employ the 80th and 20th percentiles of the probability distribution for uncertainty to
identify high and low levels of uncertainty as Aastveit et al. (2017), denoted UNCHigh
and UNCLow, respectively.56 By treating uncertainty as predetermined, there is no
feedback from the endogenous variables to the uncertainty measures, and hence the
impulse responses to a monetary policy shock can be computed as in linear structural
VAR model. Thus, the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy shocks are computed
under the assumption that the economy starts and ends with a given uncertainty level.























t−k + ηt (7)
Equations (6) and (7) are standard reduced-form VARmodels. As Aastveit et al. (2017)
point out, when I use this type of interacted VAR model, there are no further compli-
cations associated with using the restrictions to identify a monetary policy shock and
analyze its effects at high and low levels of uncertainty.
Figure 2.14 shows the probability distribution of uncertainty, in which uncertainty
56It is worth pointing out that Aastveit et al. (2017) use 90th and 10th percentiles of the historical
distribution for uncertainty. To make sure that I have enough sample to estimate the model, I extend
Aastveit et al. (2017)’s selection.
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is gauged by China’s economic policy uncertainty. The average value of 20th percentile
for uncertainty is 3.72 while that of above the 80th percentile for uncertainty is 5.83.
By performing a two-sample t-test for equal means, I can reject the null hypothesis
that two series have the same average at the 1% significance level. Hence, the average
values of high and low states of uncertainty are statistically different.
Figure 2.15 displays the effects of an unanticipated increase in the money sup-
ply and decrease in the interest rate, for different levels of uncertainty. Therefore, I
only consider the responses of monetary policy objectives (GDP growth and inflation)
to the expansionary monetary policy under different states of uncertainty. The blue
solid lines are estimated for the case where volatility is in its lower decile, while the
red dashed lines give the estimated responses when volatility is in its lower decile.
I plot the impulse responses for the first 20 months after the shock. It is obvious to
find that in response to a positive money supply shock, GDP growth increases by ap-
proximately 1.5% when uncertainty is in its lower percentile, while it increases by at
most approximately 0.5% when volatility is in its upper percentile. In addition, in-
flation slightly decreases when uncertainty is higher in response to a positive money
supply shock. In contrast, in response to a negative interest rate shock (PR−), there
is little difference in the GDP growth (and inflation) responses between high and low
uncertainty. Therefore, the money supply instrument is less effective during the high
uncertainty periods while the efficacy of interest rate instrument won’t be impaired
by the increasing uncertainty.
2.7 Conclusion
Given that China’s monetary policy is gradually shifting from the quantity-based rule
to the price-based rule, I attempt to investigate the time-varying responses of mone-
tary policy instruments in different regimes to uncertainty shocks.
I first use the narrative approach to identify monetary policy regimes in China.
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Furthermore, following the empirical framework proposed by Choi (2017), I estimate
the rolling-sample VARs and TVP-VAR models to discuss the impact of uncertainty
shocks on monetary policy objectives and instruments. The empirical findings confirm
that the interest rate gradually becomes a more effective monetary policy instrument
in tackling heightened uncertainty compared to the money supply instrument, which
supports the on-going transformation of China’s monetary policy to the price-based
rule. Additionally, I apply the historical decomposition to assess the contribution of
uncertainty andmonetary policy shocks to changes inmonetary policy objectives (GDP
growth and inflation rate). I find that changes in GDP growth and inflation rate are
mainly explained by uncertainty and interest rate shocks after 2012. Finally, I inves-
tigate the state-dependent impulse response to monetary policy shocks under low and
high states of uncertainty and find that money supply instrument is less effective dur-
ing the high uncertainty periods while the efficacy of interest rate instrument won’t be
weakened by the increasing uncertainty. To conclude, the empirical findings highlight
the economic impact of uncertainty shocks and the importance of monetary policy in
shaping the role played by uncertainty shocks.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, how to compare the responsiveness
of different monetary policy instruments to uncertainty shocks in a unified theoreti-
cal framework will be a direction for future research. A nonlinear dynamic stochastic
general equilibriummodel suggested by Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2018) will be an al-
ternative approach to study the time-varying impacts of uncertainty shocks in differ-
ent monetary policy rules, especially when the state-dependent features of monetary
policy are considered in China.
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Tables
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics
OIL INF GDP M2 PR UNC
Mean 3.873 0.819 3.744 6.285 5.888 4.743
Median 3.946 0.776 3.549 6.128 5.850 4.676
Maximum 4.941 3.630 6.954 11.307 10.080 6.840
Minimum 2.430 -0.890 2.326 3.330 4.350 2.204
Std. Dev. 0.594 0.906 0.856 1.524 1.201 0.753
Skewness -0.427 0.552 0.883 0.697 1.537 0.015
Kurtosis 2.157 3.365 3.369 4.391 6.315 3.288
Notes: The sample period is from 1997M1 to 2018M12. I have GDP growth (GDP, YoY), inflation rate
(INF, YoY), and money supply growth (M2, YoY), the log level of uncertainty (UNC) and global oil price
(OIL), the level of the policy rate (PR).
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Figures
Figure 2.1 Monetary Policy Framework in China
Source: Huang et al. (2020).
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Figure 2.2 Identification of Monetary Policy Regimes in China
Notes: The sample period of inflation rate, M2 growth, and PR is from 1997M1 to 2018M12. The sample period of the monetary policy stance
indicator is from 2000M12 to 2018M12. The monetary policy stance indicator is identified through the narrative approach. The five-value
monetary policy stance indicator is classified as follows: 2 (very easy), 1 (easy), 0 (neutral), -1 (tight), -2 (very tight). Three shaded areas
represent three salient contractionary episodes (2004M4-2004M6, 2007M7-2008M6, and 2011M4-2011M9).
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Figure 2.3 Full Sample Impulse Responses
Notes: “X to UNC” represents the response of X to one standard deviation uncertainty shock. pp denotes
percentage point. The solid lines plot the impulse responses. The shaded areas plot 68% bootstrapping
error bands.
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Figure 2.4 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Notes: I conduct the forecast error variance decomposition of each series at the prediction horizons of
h = 1...20 months.
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Figure 2.5 Robustness Checks
Notes: “X to UNC” represents the response of X to one standard deviation uncertainty shock. pp denotes
percentage point. To perform robustness checks, I consider (i) a different lag length (p=6), (ii) reversed
Cholesky ordering, (iii) a new proxy of uncertainty, (iv) the log-level transformation. The solid lines
with different colors plot the impulse responses for distinct robustness checks.
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Figure 2.6 Three-dimensional Impulse Responses: Rolling Sample VAR
Notes: “X to UNC” represents the response of X to one standard deviation uncertainty shock. pp denotes percentage point. The three-
dimensional impulse responses plot the VAR model based on the rolling sample with a fixed window length of 5 years (60 observations).
The impulse responses are indexed by the end date of each rolling sample. The time range of the VAR model is from 2001M12 to 2018M12.
The range of the horizons for each year is from 1 to 20.
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Figure 2.7 Impulse Responses from Rolling Sample VAR: 2-month Horizon
Notes: “X to UNC” represents the response of X to one standard deviation uncertainty shock. pp denotes percentage point. The impulse
responses at the horizon of 2-month plot the VAR model based on the rolling sample with a fixed window length of 5 years (60 observations).
The impulse responses are indexed by the end date of each rolling sample. The time range of the VAR model is from 2001M12 to 2018M12.
The shaded areas plot 68% bootstrapping error bands.
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Figure 2.8 Impulse Responses from Rolling Sample VAR: 4-month Horizon
Notes: “X to UNC” represents the response of X to one standard deviation uncertainty shock. pp denotes percentage point. The impulse
responses at the horizon of 4-month plot the VAR model based on the rolling sample with a fixed window length of 5 years (60 observations).
The impulse responses are indexed by the end date of each rolling sample. The time range of the VAR model is from 2001M12 to 2018M12.
The shaded areas plot 68% bootstrapping error bands.
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Figure 2.9 Rolling Sample Variance Decomposition
Notes: I estimate the forecast error variance decomposition from the rolling sample VAR during the pe-
riod of 2001M12-2018M12. I plot the contribution of uncertainty shocks to fluctuations in GDP growth,
inflation rate, money supply growth, and policy rate at the prediction horizon of 20.
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Figure 2.10 Convergence Statistics for the Variable Set of {OIL, GDP, INF, M2, PR, UNC}
Notes: The top row presents the sample autocorrelation, the middle row shows the sample path, and the bottom row shows the posterior
densities for selected parameters.
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Figure 2.11 Impulse Responses: TVP-VAR
Notes: “X to UNC” represents the response of X to one standard deviation uncertainty shock. The three-dimensional impulse responses of the
TVP-VARmodel are plotted in the first row. In the second and third rows, I plot the impulse responses at the horizons of 2-month and 4-month,
respectively.
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Figure 2.12 Historical Decomposition: GDP Growth
Notes: Historical decomposition plots the contribution of three structural shocks (M2, PR, and uncer-
tainty) to changes in GDP growth (the deviation of GDP growth from its unconditional mean).
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Figure 2.13 Historical Decomposition: Inflation Rate
Notes: Historical decomposition plots the contribution of three structural shocks (M2, PR, and uncer-
tainty) to changes in inflation rate (the deviation of inflation rate from its unconditional mean).
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Figure 2.14 Probability Distribution of Uncertainty
Notes: The proxy of uncertainty is economic policy uncertainty in China. Following Aastveit et al.
(2017), I use the 80th and 20th percentiles of the historical distribution for high and low regimes of
economic policy uncertainty, denoted UNCHigh and UNCLow, respectively.
119
Figure 2.15 State-dependent Impulse Responses of Monetary Policy Shocks
Notes: “X to Y" represents the response of X to one standard deviation Y shock. Impulse responses to an increase in the money supply shock
(or a decrease in the interest rate shock, PR−), with economic policy uncertainty index in its upper and lower percentiles. The blue solid lines
represent the impulse responses during the low states of uncertainty and the red dashed lines represent the impulse responses during the
high states of uncertainty. The shaded areas plot the 68% bootstrapping error bands.
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Appendix 2.A Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 2.16 Sensitivity Analysis: the Choice of Lag Length
Notes: In the rolling sample VAR, I set the lag length to 4. However, the impulse response functions might still depend on the selection
of different lag lengths. So, I perform a sensitivity analysis for different lag lengths and set the maximum lag length to 12. “X to UNC"
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CHAPTER 3 International Spillovers of China’s Economic Pol-
icy Uncertainty: Evidence from Time and Frequency Domains
Abstract: This paper investigates the cross-country economic policy uncertainty (EPU)
spillovers in time and frequency domains, with a focus on how China’s EPU influences
EPU in other countries. The time-domain analysis shows that China is a net receiver of
global EPU but has stronger outward spillovers during the global financial crisis. The
connectedness network demonstrates that China only plays a minor role in the trans-
mission network of global EPU. The frequency-domain results further uncover that
international spillovers of China’s EPU are mainly driven by short-term spillovers.
However, during the global financial crisis, the medium-term and long-term spillovers
temporarily dominate compared to the short-term spillovers. Overall, the empirical re-
sults have important policy implications because economic policy uncertainty arising
abroad might have domestic consequences through international spillovers channel.
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3.1 Introduction
Heightened uncertainty is believed to be a key reason contributing to the weakness
in global economic growth in recent years (Caggiano et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2014;
Karnizova and Li, 2014; Liu and Zhang, 2015; Davis, 2016; Bordo et al., 2016; Chris-
tou et al., 2017; Fang et al., 2017; Caggiano et al., 2017; Gumata and Ndou, 2017; Liow
et al., 2018). In particular, a series of geopolitical and economic shocks, such as the
Brexit and US-China trade conflicts, are perceived to have raised economic policy un-
certainty with repercussions on the domestic economy in many countries. One natural
question for macroeconomists and policymakers around the world is whether and to
what extent economic policy uncertainty originating in one country impacts economic
policy uncertainty and ultimately the business cycle in another country. Caggiano
et al. (2020) conduct a counterfactual analysis based on the impulse response func-
tions and support the existence of economic policy uncertainty spillover channel, in
particular, Caggiano et al. (2020) find that hikes in the level of the US economic policy
uncertainty foster the build up of economic policy uncertainty in Canada and, conse-
quently, exert a negative effect on the Canadian business cycle. This is an important
line of research, since if the uncertainties across economies are indeed interrelated,
then a particular economy can witness the negative impacts of uncertainty, even when
there is no change in its domestic levels of uncertainty, through the linkages caused
by the trade and financial integration. Also, if domestic uncertainty does increase,
then international uncertainty feedbacks are likely to amplify the negative effects on
the domestic economy.
Recent studies (Biljanovska et al., 2017; Fontaine et al., 2017, 2018) also evalu-
ate how China’s EPU affects the developed economies (e.g., the US, the Euro Area,
and Japan) and developing economies (e.g., Brazil, Russia, and South Korea) due to
China’s role as the largest emerging market economy. In this paper, I depart from
the previous research based on the impulse response analysis and examine the cross-
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country EPU spillover channel with a focus on how China’s EPU influences EPU in
other countries. In particular, I investigate the dynamic spillovers of EPU between
China and other countries over time and at different frequencies. To this end, I uti-
lize the spillover index approach based on the pioneered work of Diebold and Yilmaz
(2012) and Baruník and Křehlík (2018) to estimate the international spillovers of
China’s EPU and the opposite in time and frequency domains. Specifically, I modify
the spillover index approach of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) in the time domain by in-
troducing an indicator matrix. The modified model allows me to conduct a sub-sample
analysis for specific economic periods. In addition, referring to Baruník and Křehlík
(2018), I employ a measure of the spillover index in the frequency domain. This
novel approach enables me to disentangle the short-term, medium-term, and long-
termmovements in the international spillovers of China’s EPU. More importantly, the
frequency-domain analysis allows me to uncover the persistence of policy uncertainty
spillovers.57 Therefore, my research framework offers richer time-frequency dynamics
of China’s EPU spillovers.
The major findings in this paper are summarized as follows. The full sample anal-
ysis in the time domain shows that the outward spillovers of China’s EPU are smaller
in comparison to the spillovers in EPU from other countries to China, indicating that
China is a net receiver of global EPU. When I consider different economic periods,
the sub-sample estimation also supports the full sample empirical results. Moreover,
the dynamic spillover patterns based on the rolling sample estimation indicate that
China’s EPU has stronger outward spillover effects during the global financial crisis.
The connectedness network further uncovers that China only plays a minor role in the
transmission network of global EPU compared to the US, which helps better under-
stand the limited outward spillovers of China’s EPU.
57For example, the policy uncertainty caused by the major political events, such as Brexit, this type
of policy uncertainty might have permanent or long-term spillovers compared to the policy rate cut by
the Bank of England.
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Given that the cross-country EPU spillovers may have heterogeneous patterns at
different persistence levels, I view the frequency domain as a natural place for measur-
ing the spillovers among EPU indexes of sample countries à la Baruník and Křehlík
(2018). Empirical evidence in the frequency domain demonstrates that the outward
spillovers of China’s EPU are mostly driven by the high-frequency component (short-
term spillovers). During the global financial crisis, I find the medium-term and long-
term spillovers advantage over the short-term spillovers. Hence, economic policy un-
certainty caused by unexpected policy operations during the global recessions have
persistent spillovers. Overall, the empirical results have important policy implications
because when policy uncertainty in foreign countries transmits to domestic policy un-
certainty, the cross-country policy uncertainty spillovers will prolong the adverse ef-
fects of domestic policy uncertainty on the domestic economy, which is consistent with
the uncertainty spillover channel proposed by Caggiano et al. (2020). Therefore, I pro-
vide a complementary study on China’s economic policy uncertainty spillover through
the spillover index. Also, it is worth noting that spillovers at different frequencies al-
low me to tentatively investigate whether the cross-country spillovers of EPU come
from the short-term policy shifts or the long-term institutional transformation driven
by policies.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two aspects. First, current stud-
ies (Yin andHan, 2014; Klößner and Sekkel, 2014; Balli et al., 2017; Antonakakis et al.,
2018; Luk et al., 2018; Kang and Yoon, 2019) only explore the cross-country EPU
spillovers in the time domain but ignore the frequency-domain spillovers. Klößner
and Sekkel (2014) assess the spillovers of EPU among six developed countries and
demonstrate that EPU from the US and UK has larger spillovers on EPU in Canada,
Germany, Italy, and France. Kang and Yoon (2019) further point out that the Eu-
ropean Union is the largest transmitter of EPU, while China becomes a net trans-
mitter of EPU during the global financial crisis and European debt crisis. Therefore,
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EPU in developed economies has more substantial outward spillovers, whereas small
open economies and emerging economies usually behave as net importers (receivers)
of global EPU (Bloom, 2017). However, as Baruník and Křehlík (2018) point out, the
time-domain specification is insufficient to reveal differentiated linkages within differ-
ent frequency bands because heterogeneous frequency responses to shocks are simply
aggregated in the time-domain approach. Some studies (Balli et al., 2019; Albulescu
et al., 2019; Xia et al., 2020) explore frequency-domain spillovers between policy un-
certainty and other financial variables, however, seldom research ever investigate the
frequency-domain spillover pattern among policy uncertainty across countries. There-
fore, my paper follows this view and simultaneously calculates the cross-country EPU
spillover indexes in time and frequency domains.
Second, this paper complements empirical research (Han et al., 2016; Fontaine
et al., 2017, 2018) on the international spillovers of EPU inChina and finds that the dy-
namic spillovers of China’s EPU might be regime-dependent, supporting the underly-
ing nonlinear transmission of the cross-country EPU spillovers. Fontaine et al. (2017)
analyze the impacts of economic policy uncertainty from China on US macroeconomic
activity through the lens of a smooth transition vector autoregression model and con-
clude that China’s policy uncertainty shock raises US own policy uncertainty and un-
employment whereas both the industrial production and inflation decrease. Moreover,
China’s economic policy uncertainty shock dampens the US economy during recession
periods compared to expansion periods, implying significant asymmetric impacts of
China’s economic policy uncertainty shock. Fontaine et al. (2018) extend Fontaine
et al. (2017)’s work to explore how China’s economic policy uncertainty affects other
developed (the Euro Area, Japan, and South Korea) and emerging economies (Brazil
and Russia), not limited to the US. Specifically, Fontaine et al. (2018) find important
asymmetries in the responses to China’s policy uncertainty shocks of macro-variables
especially for the United States (US), the Euro Area (EA) and South Korea, because
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these countries display almost no response to the identified shock during booms. How-
ever, when hit in downturns, these countries suffer from a fall in industrial production,
inflation, and exports together with an increase in unemployment. Emerging coun-
tries (Brazil and Russia) stand out in the extent to which they significantly respond to
China’s policy uncertainty shock in both identified regimes. In particular, the uncer-
tainty spillover transmission channels are especially present in the US, Brazil, South
Korea, and Russia. Different from the analysis based on the impulse response func-
tions, this paper appeals to the spillover index by extending the Diebold and Yilmaz
(2009)’s approach and explores the spillover pattern of policy uncertainty in different
economic regimes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data
used in this paper. Section 3.3 discusses the time-domain and frequency-domain em-
pirical strategies. Section 3.4 presents the time-domain results. Section 3.5 analyzes
the frequency-domain findings. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data of Study
3.2.1 Data Sources
In essence, the definition of EPU follows the Knight’s view that uncertainty as peoples’
inability to forecast the likelihood of events happening based on an objective probabil-
ity distribution estimated on past data. EPU means that peoples’ inability to forecast
the likelihood of policies happening. More exactly, economic policy uncertainty (EPU)
measures uncertainty about who will make economic policy decisions, what economic
policy actions will be undertaken and when, and the economic effects of policy actions
(or inaction) (Baker et al., 2016, pp.1598). So, an issue occurring here is how to mea-
sure EPU now that the probability distribution of EPU is unknown? Baker et al.
(2016) construct the EPU index based on the newspaper coverage frequency. Specifi-
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cally, Baker et al. (2016) perform systematic searches of leading newspapers to obtain
a monthly count of articles that contain the following trio of terms: [“uncertainty” or
“uncertain”], [“economic” or “economy”] and [“congress”, “deficit”, “Federal Reserve”,
“legislation”, “regulation”, or “White House”].58 Consider the availability of newspa-
pers issued and characteristics of policy regimes in each country, Baker et al. (2016)
select different leading newspapers and add specific terms for distinct sample coun-
tries.59 Moreover, Baker et al. (2016) use the same approach to construct EPU indexes
for all countries, which makes the EPU comparable across countries.
In view of more strict censorship and government control of media and newspaper
(Chen and Yang, 2019), Baker et al. (2016) choose South China Morning Post issued
in Hong Kong and add [“Beijing or authorities”] in the term sets to develop China’s
EPU index, which is known as BBD-type index. In a recent study, Davis et al. (2019)
construct China’s EPU index based on twomainlandChinese newspapers: the Renmin
Daily and the Guangming Daily, which is known as DLS-type index. In the empirical
analysis, I use the BBD-type index as the proxy of China’s EPU to lower bias caused
by media censorship.
I have the monthly EPU index series of 21 countries available on the EPU website,
including China (CN), Australia (AU), Brazil (BR), Canada (CA), Chile (CL), Colom-
bia (CO), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), India (IN), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT),
Japan (JP), Netherlands (NL), Mexico (MX), South Korea (KR), Russia(RU), Spain
(ES), Sweden (SE), United Kingdom (UK), and United States (US).60 The sample coun-
tries are also main trade partners with China.61 For instance, China has already ex-
58In Appendix 3.A, I give more details on how to construct the EPU index by taking the US as an
example.
59See the EPU website for more details: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/index.html.
60Two-letter country codes in parentheses. The total GDP of 20 sample countries accounts for 62.73%
of the global GDP according to the World Bank in 2018. Therefore, the 20 sample countries well repre-
sent the rest of the world.
61Trade as a specific bilateral factor plays a highly significant role in transmitting the EPU spillovers
(Balli et al., 2017). Consider the bilateral trade with China, the total trade volume (export+import) of
20 sample countries accounts for 60.53% of China’s total trade volume according to the WTO in 2018.
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ceeded the US and becomes the largest trade partner of Brazil, in which 28% of total
Brazilian exports to China and 21% of total Brazilian imports from China (Ministry
of Commerce in China, 2020). Based on the availability of the EPU index, the sample
period is from 1997M1 to 2019M12. All variables are in log values.
3.2.2 Descriptive Analysis
Figure 3.1 plots the time series of the level EPU indexes for all countries. EPU no-
ticeably increases near the major economic and political events, including the 9/11
attacks, 2016 Brexit referendum, and China-US trade conflicts after 2018. For China,
I plot BBD-type and DLS-type indexes. Two indexes exhibit a consistent time trend,
and the correlation coefficient between the two series is close to 0.95. In addition,
both UK EPU and China’s EPU exhibit a significant upward trend, which attributes
to the Brexit after 2016 and China-US trade conflicts after 2018, respectively. I use
the correlogram in Figure 3.2 to describe the pairwise correlation coefficients between
any two countries. The darker blue color has a greater positive correlation, and the
darker red color has a greater negative correlation. Obviously, most pairwise correla-
tion coefficients are positive. Besides, a specific country group, incorporating the US,
Germany, South Korea, Canada, the UK, Spain, and China, exhibits a higher intra-
group correlation. So, there might exist more substantial pairwise spillovers of EPU
among these countries. I further find the largest correlation (0.82) between China’s
EPU and UK EPU in Table 3.1. From the regional perspective, EPU between China
and South Korea has a higher correlation in light of the closer trade connection.
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the EPU series in log values. On aver-
age, the UK has the largest EPU, and Mexico has the lowest EPU over the full sample
period. The skewness coefficients are usually negative, while major advanced and
emerging countries, including the UK, the US, China, Japan, Brazil, Canada, and
Australia, have positive skewness. The positive skewness indicates that major ad-
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vanced and emerging countries experience greater (more extreme) policy uncertainty.
Based on the results of kurtosis and skewness, although the normality doesn’t hold
in all variables, the asymptotic theory of the vector autoregression model relaxes this
assumption.
3.3 Measurement of Spillovers
To measure the spillovers of China’s EPU in time and frequency domains, my empir-
ical strategy is summarized as follows. For the time-domain measure, I follow the
methodology suggested by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) and extend it by introducing an
indicator matrix.62 Specifically, the introduction of the indicator matrix allows me to
calculate the spillover indexes of China’s EPU during different economic periods, such
as pre- and post-GFC or during expansions and recessions. For the frequency-domain
measure, Baruník and Křehlík (2018) calculate the spillover index based on the spec-
tral representation of variance decomposition, which allows comparing the relative
importance of the short-term, medium-term, and long-term components of the EPU
spillovers.
3.3.1 Time-domain Specification





WAiYt−i + εt (1)
where Ai is coefficient matrix and p is the pre-specified lag length. The disturbance
term εt follows an i.i.d white noise process. W is an indicator matrix to integrate the
full sample and sub-sample analysis. When W is an identity matrix (I), equation (1)
62Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) calculate two-way spillovers through the generalized forecast error vari-
ance decomposition and overcome the influence of variables ordering in the Cholesky decomposition.
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degenerates to a standard model of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012).
The indicator matrix W incorporates different economic scenarios. To measure the








where 0 and 1 are matrices with all 0 and all 1, respectively. So, the matrix W1
transforms equation (1) into two simple linear VAR models.
In addition, to conduct the sub-sample analysis in recessions and expansions, I de-
fine the matrix W2 as a dummy indicator for China (a 0-1 variable). The specification
of the matrix W2 is
W2 =

1 ... 0 1 ... 0 0 ... 1
. ... . ... . . ... .
1 ... 0 1 ... 0 0 ... 1

where 0s and 1s represent expansions and recessions, respectively. So, I am able to
rely on an indicator matrix to estimate the spillover index of China’s EPU in different
periods.




Biεt−i = B(L)εt (2)
where Bi =
∑p
i=1 ΦiBt−i with Bi = 0 for i < 0. L is the lag operator. Based on H-step














where Σ is the covariance matrix of disturbance term εt. σjj is the standard deviation
of error term in jth equation. ei is a selection vector, where the ith element is 1 and
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the remaining elements are 0.





So, the standardized spillover index satisfies the sum condition
∑K
j=1 θ̃ij(H) = 1. On








For country j (assume China), I am interested in estimating the total spillover
effects of China’s EPU to EPU in all other countries, as well as the opposite spillovers
of EPU (from all other countries to China). To calculate the directional spillover index




· 100 = θ̃ij(H)
K
· 100 (6)
In a similar fashion, the magnitude of the spillover index from country i to country




· 100 = θ̃ji(H)
K
· 100 (7)
Furthermore, the directional spillovers from all other countries to the country j
























Finally, it is straightforward to obtain the net spillover between country j and coun-
try i, then
Sj(H) = Sji(H)− Sij(H) (10)
For country j, the total net spillover is the difference between the directional spillover
to all other countries (Sj.(H)) and the directional spillover from all other countries
(S.j(H)). Therefore, equations (1)-(10) describe the basic procedures to calculate the
spillover index in the time domain.
3.3.2 Frequency-domain Specification
As Baruník and Křehlík (2018) emphasize, a tractable way to characterize the fre-
quency dynamics (short-term, medium-term, and long-term) of spillovers is to con-
sider the spectral representation of variance decomposition based on the frequency
responses instead of impulse responses as Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). Therefore, I fol-
low Baruník and Křehlík (2018)’s approach to investigate the heterogeneous spillover
patterns of EPU between China and other countries at different frequency dimensions.
Based on the aforementioned approach of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), the moving
average coefficients Bh calculated at h = 1, 2, ..., H horizons are used to approximate
B(L). Given a frequency response function, the moving average coefficients based on
the Fourier transform areB(e−ihω) =
∑∞
0 e
−ihωBh, where i =
√
−1. The spectral density














where ω ∈ (−π, π) in the generalized spectrum over frequency.
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Here, θij(ω) denotes the proportion of forecast error variance of ith variable explained
by variable j under the given frequency ω. To normalize, I define θ′ij(ω) as θ′ij(ω) =
θij(ω)∑K
j=1 θij(ω)
. Similar to the time-domain specification, I calculate the total, directional,
and net spillover indexes at different spectral intervals. Specifically, the total spillover










The directional spillover indexes of frequency ω from other countries to country j








θ′ij(d) · 100 (15)
Therefore, the total net spillover index of frequency ω is
Sj(ω) = Sj.(ω)− S.j(ω) (16)
Equations (11)-(16) illustrate the steps to calculate the spillover index in the fre-
quency domain.
3.3.3 Model Specification Tests
Before estimating the generalized VAR model, I should make sure that all variables
are stationary to avoid spurious regression and model instability. Augmented Dickey-
138
Fuller (ADF) test and Phillips-Perron (PP) test are widely applied in time series analy-
sis to perform stationarity tests, in which the ADF test constructs an auxiliary regres-
sion and the PP test as a nonparametric approach relaxes restrictions on the auxiliary
regression. Table 3.2 reports the unit root tests for all EPU series in the sample coun-
tries. According to the ADF unit root test, I cannot reject the nonstationary hypothe-
sis for France, China, and the UK while I reject the null hypothesis for all EPU series
based on the PP unit root. Overall, I conclude that all EPU variables are stationary
and satisfy the requirements for building the generalized VAR model. I further set
the lag length of the generalized VAR model to 2 as Klößner and Sekkel (2014).63 The
generalized VAR model is constructed in equation (1), where the dimension of Yt is
22× 1. Besides, following Klößner and Sekkel (2014), I set the value of the step length
(H) to 3, so I have a 3-step ahead forecast error to calculate the spillover index.64
3.4 Empirical Results: Time-domain Evidence
In this section, I study the full sample and sub-sample results and present the dynamic
spillovers based on the rolling sample results in the time domain. Besides, I use the
connectedness network analysis to identify China’s role in the transmission network
of global EPU.
3.4.1 Full Sample Analysis
I first discuss the static spillovers of China’s EPU on EPU in other countries and the
reverse in the time domain. I also consider the spillovers of the US EPU for compar-
ison. Table 3.3 reports the empirical results of the full sample directional spillovers.
63I also confirm that the selection of the lag length will not alter the primary results.
64In the frequency-domain analysis, the only difference is the step length when I calculate the fore-
cast error. The frequency decomposition works with unconditional impulse response functions. If the
horizon of impulse response function lowers than 100, this will result in an estimation issue that some
frequencies depending on the bound setting may not be estimable. So, I have to select a longer length
of step (H = 200) to perform forecast error variance decomposition analysis.
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The first column in Table 3.3 presents the outward spillovers of China’s EPU and the
second column presents the inward spillovers. It is straightforward to indicate that
China’s EPU has the largest spillover to the EPU of South Korea (2.95) and the small-
est spillover effect on Swedish EPU (0.30).65 In the opposite direction, South Korea’s
EPU also has the greatest spillover to China’s EPU (8.49), while the EPU of Russia has
the lowest spillover to China’s EPU (0.17). Further calculation shows that the total
outward spillover index of China’s EPU is 31.08, and the total spillover index of EPU
in other countries on China’s EPU is 59.59. Hence, the net spillover index of China’s
EPU is negative (-28.51), suggesting that China is a net receiver of EPU spillovers for
the considered countries.
Given the fact that US EPU plays a pivotal role in pushing global policy uncer-
tainty (Baker et al., 2016), the third and fourth columns in Table 3.3 further report
the outward spillovers of US EPU and the reverse. Because the outward spillovers of
US EPU exceed the spillovers to US EPU, the net spillover index of US EPU is positive
(12.32). In contrast to China, the US is a net exporter of global EPU to the rest of the
world over the sample period.
3.4.2 Sub-sample Analysis
Pre- and Post-GFC Figure 3.3 plots the time trend of China’s EPU and global
EPU.66 Taking the outbreak of the global financial crisis in September 2008 as a cutoff
point, I am able to split the full sample into two sub-samples (1997M1-2008M9 and
2008M10-2019M12).67 From Figure 3.1, I observe that the correlation coefficient be-
tween China’s EPU and global EPU is 0.678 in the first period, and then rises to 0.908
65This means that 2.95% of forecast error variance in South Korea’s EPU comes from the spillovers
of China’s EPU.
66From the EPU index website, global EPU index is a GDP-weighted average of EPU indexes in 20
sample countries.
67I use September 2008 as the outburst of the global financial crisis because Lehman Brothers went
bankrupt in September 2008 after the Fed declined to guarantee its loans.
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after the GFC. Table 3.4 reports the spillovers of China’s EPU before and after the
GFC. It is evident to find that the net spillover index of China’s EPU is -41.53 in the
post-GFC period, which is substantially larger than the net spillover in the pre-GFC
period in absolute value (41.53 vs. 1.14). Therefore, China contributes less to global
EPU after the GFC (72.67 vs. 38.51) but receives more external policy uncertainty
(73.81 vs. 80.04). The higher correlation between China’s EPU and global EPU in the
post-GFC period reflects the rising spillovers in EPU from other countries to China
rather than the opposite channel.
Recessions and Expansions Existing studies conclude that the spillovers of
China’s EPU are regime-dependent (Fontaine et al., 2017, 2018). I further ask how
large are the spillovers of China’s EPU during economic expansions and recessions.
Figure 3.4 plots China’s recession indicator calculated by the OECD, in which 1s repre-
sent recessions and 0s represent expansions.68 The recession periods of China’s econ-
omy include 1998M4-1999M7, 2000M7-2002M1, 2007M12-2009M2, 2011M8-2012M11,
2014M1-2016M10, and 2019M1-2019M12. Table 3.5 reports the time-domain results
of China’s EPU spillovers during expansions and recessions. The net spillover index
during expansions is -0.63, slightly smaller (in absolute value) than the net spillover
index (-1.49) during recessions. Therefore, if I only focus on the static directional
spillover index, there is no obvious evidence supporting the view that China’s EPU
has greater spillovers during recessions, which is different from previous studies rely-
ing on the impulse response functions (Fontaine et al., 2017; Han et al., 2016; Gabauer
and Gupta, 2018).
68The identification of the OECD recession indicator is based on the growth cycle approach, where
business cycles and turning points are measured and identified in the deviation-from-trend series. The
OECD relies on the industrial value added in China at 1995 price to identify turning points in the
growth cycle. The turning point detection algorithm is a simplified version of the original Bry and
Boschan routine.
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3.4.3 Rolling Sample Analysis
The preceding discussion considers the static analysis but ignores the dynamic spillover
patterns of China’s EPU. To capture the time-varying directional spillovers and pair-
wise net spillovers in EPU between China and other countries, I turn to the rolling
sample analysis.
Following Klößner and Sekkel (2014), I have a 60-month (5 years) rolling window
length in the baseline estimation. I also consider two extra window lengths to ensure
the robustness of the rolling sample conclusion. One window length is 36-month (3
years), and another window length is 120-months (10 years). Figure 3.5 plots the time
series of China’s EPU spillovers to EPU in other countries (the solid blue line) and the
opposite (the dashed red line). I also plot the time series of the net spillovers in China’s
EPU in Figure 3.5. When the value of the net spillover index is positive, China’s EPU
will have a larger outward spillover. In the rolling sample model where the window
length is 60-month, the outward spillovers of China’s EPU are greater (positive net
spillovers) during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis.69 The rolling sample analysis
props up the view that China becomes a net transmitter of policy uncertainty during
the global financial crisis (Kang and Yoon, 2019). A possible reason causing greater
outward spillovers of China’s EPU attributes to more active policy operations from
the Chinese government (e.g., 4-Trillion-Yuan Stimulus Package), which substantially
raise China’s policy uncertainty during the GFC, therefore, unexpected policy opera-
tions will push up the global policy uncertainty during this period. Before and after
the GFC, the outward spillovers of China’s EPU are less than the spillovers to China’s
EPU, indicating the negative net spillovers. Therefore, the net spillovers of China’s
EPU are countercyclical, as previously shown by Klößner and Sekkel (2014).
The rolling sample estimation analyzes the pairwise net spillovers in the time do-
main. The pairwise net spillover is the difference between the spillover of China’s EPU
69The results of the rolling sample analysis are insensitive to the selection of the window length.
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to country i’s EPU and the spillover of country i’s EPU to China’s EPU. So, if the value
of the pairwise net spillover is positive, China’s EPUwill have a greater net spillover to
the country i’s EPU. The results of the pairwise net spillovers are shown in Figure 3.6
in which the window length is 60-month. Similarly, I plot the pairwise net spillovers
when the window length is 36-month in Figure 3.7 and 120-month in Figure 3.8. Con-
sistent with the dynamic spillovers in Figure 3.5, it is straightforward to conclude that
the pairwise net spillovers in EPU between China and other sample countries (except
for Netherlands, Ireland, and Brazil) are temporarily positive during the global finan-
cial crisis but usually negative in other periods. However, for Netherlands, Ireland,
and Brazil, the pairwise net spillovers of China’s EPU are persistently positive after
the GFC, which implies more substantial spillovers of China’s policy uncertainty to
policy uncertainty in these countries.
3.4.4 Connectedness Network Analysis
To identify the key player in the global EPU network, the core-periphery structure of
the pairwise spillovers network is first plotted. In Figure 3.9, blue vertices and purple
vertices respectively refer to the core and periphery structures of full sample pairwise
spillovers. Specifically, the value of the core (periphery) vertex is above (below) the
average of full sample pairwise spillovers. The core of the pairwise spillovers network
is comprised of only two countries (US and UK) who governed the overall spillover
patterns of the global EPU network, while nineteen countries are detected in the pe-
riphery structure of pairwise spillovers network.
To further visualize the dynamic spillovers of China’s EPU, I plot the complex net-
work of static pairwise net spillovers as Xia et al. (2020) and Kang et al. (2019). Figure
3.10 and Figure 3.11 show the connectedness network of the pairwise net spillovers of
EPU among sample countries. I use two different significance levels, α = 0.1 in Figure
3.10 and α = 0.05 in Figure 3.11. An arrow from one node to another node indicates
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that there exists a positive net spillover index. Therefore, the connectedness network
identifies the potential transmitters or recipients of policy uncertainty.
In Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11, I find that the US is a local hub of global policy
uncertainty propagation. On the contrary, China only plays an affiliated role in the
transmission network of global EPU. I also note a tighter connection in France, Italy,
China, theUS, Ireland, and theUK compared to other sample countries. Besides, EPU
in the US and UK generates positive net spillovers to China’s EPU. In sum, the con-
nectedness network analysis offers supplementary evidence to better understand the
static and dynamic patterns of China’s EPU spillovers and props up the time-domain
results that China’s EPU has limited outward spillovers to EPU in other countries.
3.5 Empirical Results: Frequency-domain Evidence
In this section, I further study the spillover patterns of China’s EPU in the frequency
domain. In particular, to uncover the heterogeneous spillover patterns of China’s EPU
at different persistence levels, I first investigate the static frequency-domain spillovers
and then turn to discuss the dynamic frequency-domain spillovers.
3.5.1 Static Frequency-domain Spillovers
Following Kang et al. (2019), I decompose the directional spillovers of China’s EPU
based on four different frequency bands (within 1 month, 1 month to 3 months, 3
months to 6 months, and more than 6 months).70 These bands are selected to allow
enough variation to examine how China’s EPU transmits to EPU in other countries
and the opposite. In particular, the first frequency band (within 1 month) reflects
the short-term spillover effects, the second and third frequency bands (1 month to
3 months and 3 months to 6 months) reflect the medium-term spillover effects, and
70In theory, the time-domain spillovers should equal the sum of the frequency-domain spillovers
within 1 month, 1 month to 3 months, 3 months to 6 months, and more than 6 months.
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the last frequency band (more than 6 months) reflects the long-term spillover effects.
Table 3.6 reports the results of the frequency-domain spillovers. Again, I report the
spillovers of US EPU at different frequencies as a comparison.
I first focus on the directional spillovers of China’s EPU. The outward spillovers of
China’s EPU significantly decline (from 0.750 to 0.427) with a drop in the frequencies
(from less than 1month tomore than 6months). Different from the outward spillovers,
the spillovers in EPU from other countries to China are greater in the medium term
(1.083 and 1.058) but smaller in the short term and long term (0.940 and 0.449). An-
other important finding in Table 3.6 is changes in net spillovers at different frequen-
cies. No matter in the short run or the long run, the net spillovers of China’s EPU are
always negative. Moreover, China’s role as a net receiver of global EPU is reinforced
in the long term. In contrast, the net spillovers of US EPU turn from positive to neg-
ative, indicating that the US shifts from a net exporter of policy uncertainty to a net
receiver.
3.5.2 Dynamic Frequency-domain Spillovers
In this part, I discuss the dynamic frequency-domain spillovers. In line with the dy-
namic time-domain estimation, I select the 60-month rolling window length. Fig-
ure 3.12 shows the frequency decomposition of the dynamic directional spillovers of
China’s EPU. I plot the spillovers in EPU from other countries to China (top figure in
the second column in Figure 3.12) and from China to other countries (bottom figure in
the second column in Figure 3.12) at various frequencies.
In view of the spillovers in EPU from other countries to China, I find that the short-
term spillovers dominate the medium-term and long-term spillovers over the sam-
ple period, so the spillovers to China’s EPU are mainly driven by the high-frequency
component (less than 1 month). During the global financial crisis, the short-term
spillovers to China’s EPU substantially reduce while the medium-term and long-term
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spillovers to China’s EPU keep stable. For the outward spillovers of China’s EPU
to EPU in other countries, I uncover a similar propagation pattern. Specifically, the
short-term outward spillovers still dominate and exceed the medium-term and long-
term outward spillovers in most periods. An exception is that, during the global fi-
nancial crisis, the outward spillovers of China’s EPU at different frequencies have the
same magnitudes, which intuitively explains the time-domain outward spillover pat-
terns in this period (see the bottomfigure in the first column in Figure 3.12). Therefore,
economic policy uncertainty caused by unexpected policy operations during economic
recessions might have relatively permanent spillovers.71 Figure 3.13 further presents
the pairwise net spillovers in the frequency domain. Amajor finding from the pairwise
net spillovers is the long-term spillovers surpassing the short-term spillovers around
2015-2016, and I notice that this period corresponds to the critical domestic institution
and policy changes in China as pointed out by Huang and Luk (2020), including the
reform of the renminbi’s (RMB) exchange rate formation mechanism and an unsuc-
cessful launch of the circuit-breaker mechanism in Chinese stock market in 2016.72
3.6 Conclusion
This paper revisits the spillover effects of EPU among 21 advanced and emerging coun-
tries, with a focus on how China’s EPU transmits to EPU in other countries. In partic-
ular, I investigate the spillovers of China’s EPU in time and frequency domains based
on the work of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) and Baruník and Křehlík (2018), respec-
tively.
The main empirical results are summarized as follows. I first extend the general-
71Baruník and Křehlík (2018) conclude that the rising role of the long-term spillovers attributes to
the systematic shocks at lower frequencies.
72I also notice a sharp increase in the directional spillovers of China’s EPU during 2015-2016 in Fig-
ure 3.12. Balli et al. (2017) explore the determinants of the cross-country EPU spillovers and conclude
that the magnitude of EPU spillovers is higher for countries having higher vulnerability in terms of
fiscal, trade, or financial liability imbalances.
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ized VAR model proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) with an indicator matrix and
measure the spillovers of EPU in the time domain. From the full sample analysis, I
find that the outward spillovers of China’s EPU are smaller compared to the spillovers
to China’s EPU, indicating that China is a net receiver of global EPU. The sub-sample
results also support the full sample analysis. Furthermore, the dynamic spillovers
based on the rolling sample estimation show that China’s EPU has stronger outward
spillovers during the global financial crisis. As demonstrated by the connectedness
network analysis, I show that China only plays a minor role in the transmission net-
work of global EPU compared to the US, which to some extent helps better understand
the limited outward spillovers of China’s EPU.
Given that the spillovers of EPUmay generate heterogeneous patterns at different
frequencies, I measure the spillovers of China’s EPU based on the frequency-domain
approach proposed by Baruník and Křehlík (2018). The frequency-domain results un-
cover that the spillovers of China’s EPU are mainly driven by the short-term compo-
nent, whereas the medium-term and long-term spillovers prevail over the short-term
spillovers during the global financial crisis. Therefore, economic policy uncertainty
caused by unexpected policy operations during economic recessions might have rel-
atively permanent spillovers. Overall, the empirical conclusions have crucial policy
implications because the cross-country policy uncertainty spillovers will deepen the
negative effects of domestic policy uncertainty on the domestic economy.73 More im-
portantly, it is necessary for policymakers to design regulatory policies aimed at re-
ducing the policy uncertainty spillovers from other countries, especially the short-term
spillovers.
73The negative impact of EPU on the domestic economy has been confirmed by a series of studies,
including Bloom (2014), Baker et al. (2016), and Choi and Shim (2019).
147
Tables
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.Dev Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
Australia 4.465 0.526 4.477 3.245 5.820 0.123 -0.338
Brazil 4.795 0.563 4.818 3.104 6.518 0.076 0.165
Canada 4.827 0.624 4.850 3.404 6.206 0.032 -0.953
Chile 4.616 0.417 4.609 3.453 5.648 -0.067 -0.331
Colombia 4.584 0.337 4.566 3.715 5.465 -0.112 -0.432
France 4.865 0.737 4.991 2.424 6.354 -0.570 -0.247
Germany 4.765 0.478 4.757 3.348 6.118 -0.099 -0.137
Greece 4.557 0.277 4.547 3.630 5.240 -0.299 0.660
India 4.436 0.480 4.433 3.216 5.648 -0.003 -0.374
Ireland 4.587 0.572 4.681 2.995 5.642 -0.535 -0.232
Italy 4.633 0.354 4.647 3.456 5.497 -0.241 0.136
Japan 4.648 0.309 4.647 3.889 5.477 0.273 -0.106
Korea 4.714 0.517 4.736 3.110 6.288 -0.159 0.299
Mexico 4.330 0.671 4.311 2.141 6.061 -0.093 0.160
Netherlands 4.498 0.373 4.519 3.304 5.454 -0.159 0.114
Russia 4.615 0.719 4.653 2.518 6.067 -0.430 -0.138
Spain 4.570 0.336 4.576 3.435 5.457 -0.165 -0.118
Sweden 4.510 0.206 4.526 3.984 5.055 -0.130 -0.293
UK 4.944 0.778 4.900 3.232 7.040 0.153 -0.894
US 4.723 0.378 4.697 3.802 5.649 0.137 -0.446
China 4.727 0.740 4.683 2.122 6.748 0.109 0.612
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Table 3.2 Unit Root Tests for EPU
ADF PP
Australia -5.010*** (0.000) -6.447*** (0.000)
Brazil -4.444*** (0.000) -9.071*** (0.000)
Canada -2.857* (0.052) -3.346** (0.013)
Chile -3.113** (0.026) -7.532*** (0.000)
Colombia -5.891*** (0.000) -8.706*** (0.000)
France -2.473 (0.123) -4.119*** (0.001)
Germany -5.248*** (0.000) -7.765*** (0.000)
Greece -6.797*** (0.000) -6.636*** (0.000)
India -3.609*** (0.006) -7.166*** (0.000)
Ireland -3.103** (0.027) -13.476***(0.000)
Italy -3.868*** (0.002) -9.914*** (0.000)
Japan -5.206** (0.000) -5.406*** (0.000)
South Korea -4.726*** (0.000) -5.906*** (0.000)
Mexico -3.269** (0.017) -5.971*** (0.000)
Netherlands -3.739*** (0.000) -8.546*** (0.000)
Russia -4.001*** (0.001) -10.597***(0.000)
Spain -3.036** (0.033) -5.030*** (0.000)
Sweden -4.765*** (0.000) -8.192*** (0.000)
UK -2.383 (0.147) -2.837* (0.054)
US -6.312*** (0.000) -6.416*** (0.000)
China -1.126 (0.706) -4.975*** (0.000)
Notes: I consider the ADF and PP tests incorporating intercept. P-value in parentheses. ***, ** and *
indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3.3 Full Sample Spillovers in the Time Domain
China US
To From To From
Australia 1.37 4.46 7.06 9.79
Brazil 1.15 2.28 0.87 0.71
Canada 1.74 7.75 9.66 10.11
Chile 1.44 3.64 3.74 3.63
Colombia 1.55 2.78 6.17 3.93
France 1.32 1.17 6.31 5.08
Germany 1.95 3.21 7.22 4.84
Greece 1.16 3.12 3.28 3.48
India 0.95 0.60 3.91 2.08
Ireland 1.07 0.60 2.86 0.36
Italy 1.96 2.97 4.49 3.19
Japan 2.25 3.37 2.78 3.91
South Korea 2.95 8.49 8.27 7.57
Mexico 1.32 3.00 9.17 5.15
Netherlands 1.58 0.95 5.35 2.27
Russia 1.45 0.17 0.46 0.33
Spain 0.91 1.64 3.59 2.29
Sweden 0.30 0.52 3.68 2.69
UK 2.71 3.72 5.96 4.38
US 1.96 5.13 - -
China - 5.13 1.96
Total 31.08 59.59 97.34 92.88
Net -28.51 4.46
Notes: Net spillover = To - From. “To” represents the spillovers of China’s (US) EPU to EPU in other
countries. “From” represents the spillovers of EPU in other countries to China’s (US) EPU.
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Table 3.4 Sub-sample Analysis in the Time Domain: Pre- and Post-GFC
1997M1-2008M9 2009M10-2019M12
To From To From
Australia 2.87 5.70 1.17 8.07
Brazil 3.28 9.46 2.53 4.03
Canada 5.19 9.80 0.86 4.27
Chile 2.16 3.86 2.38 3.06
Colombia 3.27 2.33 0.66 0.98
France 5.36 1.69 1.55 3.73
Germany 3.28 4.57 1.87 4.15
Greece 3.72 5.61 3.51 1.76
India 3.58 1.93 0.86 7.58
Ireland 5.42 3.05 1.37 3.89
Italy 3.83 2.22 1.86 7.00
Japan 3.03 5.69 0.91 7.60
South Korea 3.03 2.09 1.77 4.45
Mexico 0.71 0.68 1.68 2.48
Netherlands 4.22 1.02 3.66 1.59
Russia 2.55 1.40 4.12 1.24
Spain 5.29 5.56 0.49 6.24
Sweden 3.81 2.09 1.21 2.27
UK 5.50 2.21 4.03 2.86
US 2.56 2.82 2.02 2.79
Total 72.67 73.81 38.51 80.04
Net -1.14 -41.53
Notes: Net spillover = To - From. “To” represents the spillovers of China’s EPU to EPU in other coun-
tries. “From” represents the spillovers of EPU in other countries to China’s EPU.
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Table 3.5 Sub-sample Analysis in the Time Domain: Recessions and Expan-
sions
Recessions Expansions
To From To From
Australia 4.70 4.90 4.57 4.57
Brazil 4.65 4.61 4.73 4.55
Canada 4.82 4.84 4.77 4.98
Chile 4.68 4.81 4.59 4.75
Colombia 4.68 4.78 4.70 4.88
France 4.79 4.77 4.80 4.73
Germany 4.71 4.82 4.68 4.78
Greece 4.64 4.82 4.67 4.94
India 4.65 4.83 4.55 4.57
Ireland 4.77 4.46 4.73 4.82
Italy 4.71 4.83 4.70 4.91
Japan 4.67 4.82 4.66 4.89
South Korea 4.82 4.89 4.73 4.91
Mexico 4.61 4.68 4.60 4.35
Netherlands 4.61 4.68 4.63 4.79
Russia 4.83 4.61 4.71 4.17
Spain 4.69 4.84 4.65 4.80
Sweden 4.67 4.73 4.77 4.91
UK 4.87 4.86 4.67 4.90
US 4.73 4.78 4.99 4.81
Total 94.31 94.95 93.52 95.02
Net -0.63 -1.49
Notes: Net spillover = To - From. “To” represents the spillovers of China’s EPU to EPU in other coun-
tries. “From” represents the spillovers of EPU in other countries to China’s EPU.
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Table 3.6 Spillovers of EPU: Frequency-domain Perspective
Frequency Bands Directional Spillovers China US
To 0.750 2.408
with 1 month From 0.940 1.836
Net -0.190 0.572
To 0.621 0.998
1 month to 3 months From 1.083 0.995
Net -0.462 0.003
To 0.575 0.615
3 months to 6 months From 1.058 0.667
Net -0.482 -0.052
To 0.427 0.402
more than 6 months From 0.449 0.796
Net -0.368 -0.047
Notes: Net spillover = To - From. “To” represents the spillovers of China’s (US) EPU to EPU in other
countries. “From” represents the spillovers of EPU in other countries to China’s (US) EPU.
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Figures
Figure 3.1 Time Trend of EPU
Notes: The sample period is from 1997M1 to 2019M12. For China’s EPU, I have the BBD-type index
based on South China Morning Post and the DLS-type index based on two popular mainland Chinese
newspapers (the Renmin Daily and the Guangming Daily).
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Figure 3.2 Correlogram of EPU
Notes: The correlogram plots the correlation of pairwise EPU between any two countries.
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Figure 3.3 China’s EPU and Global EPU
Notes: The shaded area represents the time period after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in
September 2008. Corr is the correlation coefficient.
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Figure 3.4 Recession Indicator in China
Notes: This figure plots the recession indicator in China published by the OECD, in which 0s denote
expansion periods and 1s denote recession periods.
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Figure 3.5 Dynamic Spillovers in the Time Domain
Notes: The rolling window length is 60-month (5 years) in the first row. In the second row, the window
length is 36-month (3 years) and in the third row, the window length is 120-month (10 years). Net=To-
From. “To” represents the spillovers of China’s EPU to EPU in other countries. “From” represents the
spillovers of EPU in other countries to China’s EPU.
158
Figure 3.6 Pairwise Net Spillovers in the Time Domain: 60-month
Notes: The rolling window length is 60-month (5 years). Net=To-From. “To” represents the spillovers of China’s EPU to EPU in other countries.
“From” represents the spillovers of EPU in other countries to China’s EPU.
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Figure 3.7 Pairwise Net Spillovers in the Time Domain: 36-month
Notes: The rolling window length is 36months (3 years). Net=To-From. “To” represents the spillovers of China’s EPU to EPU in other countries.
“From” represents the spillovers of EPU in other countries to China’s EPU.
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Figure 3.8 Pairwise Net Spillovers in the Time Domain: 120-month
Notes: The rolling window length is 120 months (10 years). Net=To-From. “To” represents the spillovers of China’s EPU to EPU in other
countries. “From” represents the spillovers of EPU in other countries to China’s EPU.
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Figure 3.9 Core-periphery Structure
Notes: The blue vertex and purple vertex refer to the core and periphery structures of full sample pairwise spillovers, respectively. The value
of the core (periphery) vertex is above (below) the average of full sample pairwise spillovers.
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Figure 3.10 Connectedness Network: α = 0.1
Notes: I only plot the backbone of the pairwise net spillovers, in which the precision of the significance
test is α = 0.1.
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Figure 3.11 Connectedness Network: α = 0.05
Notes: I only plot the backbone of the pairwise net spillovers, in which the precision of the significance
test is α = 0.05.
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Figure 3.12 Dynamic Directional Spillovers in the Frequency Domain
Notes: The rolling window length is 60-month (5 years). The left column plots the dynamic directional spillovers in the time domain and
the right column plots the corresponding decomposition of the dynamic directional spillovers in the frequency domain. “To” represents the
spillovers of China’s EPU to EPU in other countries. “From” represents the spillovers of EPU in other countries to China’s EPU.
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Figure 3.13 Dynamic Pairwise Net Spillovers in the Frequency Domain
Notes: The rolling window length is 60-month (5 years). Net=To-From. “To” represents the spillovers of China’s EPU to EPU in other countries.
“From” represents the spillovers of EPU in other countries to China’s EPU.
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Appendix 3.A Measurement of EPU
Baker et al. (2016) build the index of policy-related economic uncertainty based on
newspaper coverage frequency. Following Baker et al. (2016), I take the US as an
example to describe the basic steps to construct the EPU index.
First, Baker et al. (2016) select 10 leading newspapers in the US, including USA
Today, Miami Herald, Chicago Tribune, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Boston
Globe, San Francisco Chronicle, Dallas Morning News, New York Times, and Wall
Street Journal.
Second, they perform systematic searches of 10 leading newspapers to obtain a
monthly count of articles that simultaneously incorporate the following trio of terms:
[“uncertainty” or “uncertain”], [“economic” or “economy”] and one or more of the fol-
lowing: [“congress”, “deficit”, “Federal Reserve”, “legislation”, “regulation”, or “White
House”] (including variants like “uncertainties”, “regulatory”, or “the Fed”). Specifi-
cally, an eligible article must simultaneously contain at least one word from each of
three term sets list above. For instance, an article including [“uncertainty”], [“eco-
nomic”], and [“congress”] satisfies the search requirements.74
Third, given the difficulty that these raw counts vary across newspapers and time,
they scale the raw counts by the total number of articles in the same newspaper and
month.
Finally, they standardize each monthly newspaper-level series to unit standard
deviation over the sample period and average across the 10 newspapers by month,
then normalize the 10-newspaper series to a mean of 100.
Consider the availability of newspapers issued in each country, Baker et al. (2016)
and subsequent studies select different leading newspapers and add specific policy-
74Given that the text mining approach is a computer-automated method, this means that measuring
policy uncertainty might raise potential concerns about articles’ reliability and accuracy. To address
these concerns, Baker et al. (2016) conduct an extensive audit study of randomly selected articles drawn
from major U.S. newspapers and find a high correlation between the human- and computer-generated
indexes.
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relevant terms for distinct sample countries. For example, in view of more strict cen-
sorship and government control of media and newspapers (Chen and Yang, 2019),
Baker et al. (2016) choose South China Morning Post issued in Hong Kong and add
[“Beijing or authorities”] in the term sets to develop China’s EPU index. Table 3.7
provides a detailed summary of the terms sets used for each sample country when
constructing the economic policy uncertainty index. Baker et al. (2016) use the same
approach to construct the EPU index for other countries, which makes the EPU index
comparable across countries.
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Notes: The leading newspapers in some sample countries are published in the local language rather than English.
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CONCLUSION
Uncertainty is a fact in the global economy. Uncertainty deteriorates the macroe-
conomic and financial conditions in all countries, implying a larger social welfare loss.
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic supports this view. Baker et al. (2020) con-
clude that more than half of the contraction in real GDP growth is caused by COVID-
induced uncertainty. Also, Leduc and Liu (2020) demonstrate that the negative im-
pact of the COVID-19 on the economy can be further amplified and prolonged by rising
uncertainty.
Compared to the level shock, it is more difficult to estimate the impact of un-
certainty shocks, especially in emerging market economies. This dissertation helps
us better understand the outcomes of uncertainty shocks based on the experience of
China.
Chapter 1 investigates the impact of US uncertainty shocks on China’s macroecon-
omy with a focus on the dynamic response of investment. Using a structural vector
autoregressionmodel, I find that thewait-and-seemechanism of aggregate investment
in the face of heightened US uncertainty disappears in China. Robust evidence con-
firms that the increase in state-owned enterprises’ investment in response to height-
ened uncertainty explains this puzzle, while private-owned enterprises’ investment
decreases as expected. I apply regime-dependent local projections to link uncertainty
shocks with credit regimes to explore whether the impact of US uncertainty shocks
on investment in China has varied over time in connection with the states of bank
loans. The empirical results support a positive response of state-owned enterprises’
investment to increased US uncertainty during the tightening of medium- and long-
term bank loans but a negative reaction when short-term bank loans are tightening.
Finally, I show that economic policy uncertainty conveying political signals leads to
a decline in state-owned enterprises’ investment. Overall, this paper provides richer
empirical evidence on the investment-uncertainty nexus.
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Chapter 2 examines the time-varying responses of monetary policy to uncertainty
shocks in China. Based on China’s monetary policy regimes identified by the narra-
tive approach to identify China’s monetary policy regimes, the rolling sample VAR
confirms the time-varying patterns of distinct monetary policy instruments in cop-
ing with uncertainty shocks. The time-varying parameters VAR further shows that
heightened uncertainty leads to a persistent decline in the policy rate and money sup-
ply, suggesting that the interest rate is a more effective monetary policy instrument
in response to uncertainty shocks. I finally investigate the state-dependent impulse
responses to monetary policy shocks under low and high levels of uncertainty and find
that money supply instrument is less effective during the high uncertainty periods
while the efficacy of interest rate instrument won’t be weakened by the increasing
uncertainty. Overall, the empirical findings support the on-going transformation of
China’s monetary policy from the quantity-based to the price-based policy rule.
Chapter 3 explores the cross-country economic policy uncertainty (EPU) spillovers
in time and frequency domains, with a focus on how China’s EPU influences EPU
in other countries. The time-domain analysis shows that China is a net receiver of
global EPU but has stronger outward spillovers during the global financial crisis. The
connectedness network demonstrates that China only plays a minor role in the trans-
mission network of global EPU. The frequency-domain results further uncover that
international spillovers of China’s EPU are mainly driven by short-term spillovers.
However, during the global financial crisis, the medium-term and long-term spillovers
temporarily dominate compared to the short-term spillovers. Overall, the empirical re-
sults have important policy implications because economic policy uncertainty arising
abroad might have domestic consequences through international spillovers channel.
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